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Each paper in this report attempts to understand different facets of a paradox: despite massive 
economic development investments since the late 19th  century, the lndus Valley region, now the 
heart of modern Pakistan, is one of the poorest areas of the world. Most of the development 
investment has been in irrigation, yet irrigated agriculture in Pakistan remains very low in produc- 
tivity by all conventional measures in comparison with its apparent potential. Or, as many rural 
Pakistanis say, "In Pakistan we have everything - good soil, water, climate, and people. Yet we 
remain poor." 
The paper by James Wolf analyzes the present level of financing OEM at the provincial level, 
and evaluates its adequacy. Based on a rapid reconnaissance during a consulting assignment, the 
paper is not intended to be comprehensive. However, it provides a useful foray into the issues, and 
raises questions that need further investigation. The author wishes to acknowledge W. L.  McAnlis 
and W. Rusk who worked with the author on the USAID-sponsored study that provided much of 
the information contained in this paper. He also appreciates the constructive comments made by 
Don Humpal, Douglas Merrey, and Edward Va7lder Velde. 
The three papers by Douglas Merrey analyze from slightly differing perspectives local level soci- 
ological and ecological processes that have very important implications for irrigation system man- 
agement and development policy at the macro level. The research was supported by a Social 
Science Research Council Foreign Area Fellowship in 1976-77. The first paper was originally 
titled "Local level management strategies and the state in the lndus Food Machine" and was pres- 
ented at the symposium, "Lands at Risk in  the Third World: Local Level Perspectives." sponsored 
by the Institute for Development Anthropology and Clark University Cooperative Agreement with 
USAID on Human Settlements and Natural Resource Systems Analysis, 10.12  October 1985. The 
author is grateful for the useful critical comments by Mark Svendsen. Hugh Plunkett, Robert 
Wade, James Wolf, and Thomas Wickham. The second paper was originally written while Merrey 
was employed on Colorado State University's Water Management Research Project in Pakistan 
under United States Agency for International Development contract number AID/ta-c-l411. The 
author is grateful to Hugh Plunkett, Ashfaq Mirza, John Reuss, and Brian Spooner for helpful 
comments. The third paper was prepared for presentation at the Sixth Afro-Asian Regional Con- 
ference of the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage, 9-16 March 1987. The author 
appreciates and, in some cases, incorporates comments by Hammond Murray-Rust and Edward 
Vander Velde. 
Both authors wish to express their appreciation to the editorial and production staff at IIMI. 
In mid-1  986, the Pakistan branch office of the International Irrigation Management Institute 
was formally established, and James Wolf was named its Director. These four papers inaugurate 
the important research of IIMl's new office. We hope they will stimulate policy discussion as well 
as collaborative research'sn {he  critical problems of irrigation management in Pakistan. 
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44 COST AND FINANCING OF IRRIGATION SYSTEM OPERATIONS 
AND MAINTENANCE IN PAKISTAN 
James M.  Wolf' 
Introduction 
Despite concern over poorly maintained irrigation systems and insufficient investment in  opera- 
tions and maintenance (O&M)  for irrigation systems in most developing couqtries, there is little 
agreement about how much money is required. A review of 18 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
appraisal reports for irrigation projects in Asia, covering the period 1969-78, revealed O&M esti- 
mates ranging from USS15 - USSl20  per hectare (ADB 1980).  This is not surprising given the var- 
iety of irrigation systems involved. What is surprising is the absence of published information on 
what is actually spent for O&M. 
Funding for irrigation system O&M in Pakistan has not been adequate to maintain the lndus sys- 
tem in  good working order. As a result, irrigation operations are adversely affected. Irrigation facil- 
ities, particularly canals and drains, have deteriorated to  the point where the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), the World Bank, and the Government of Pakistan are 
jointly providing USS118 million to rehabilitate portions of the system in what is commonly termed 
"deferred maintenance." Under 1982 agreements that underpin the rehabilitation project, Pakis- 
tan's provinces agreed to step-up their funding for O&M. However, the level of funding needed to 
adequately maintain the irrigation system2 was not clear then and is still not fully understood. 
This paper presents 1983/84 costs of irrigation system O&M for Pakistan. It describes the facili- 
ties maintained by the Provincial Irrigation Departments (PIDs), details current organization and 
staffing levels, and discusses income sources and water charges. Lastly, it discusses certain O&M 
policy related issues. 
Characteristics of Irrigation Systems 
Historical. Although irrigation had been practiced along the rivers and streams of Pakistan for 
centuries, the lndus system today dates primarily from works constructed by the British between 
1850  and 1947. and from works built post-partition and/or  as a result of the 1960  lndus Waters 
Treaty. The first irrigation works were constructed to create employment opportunities for war 
veterans (Michel 1967). A second series of facilities were opened to encourage resettlement in 
areas that were largely uninhabited and thereby generate revenues from sale of state lands. A 
second objective was to maximize the command area and prevent famine by providing water to a 
large number of families. 
The objective of projects constructed in the early 1900s was to generate revenue by selling 
water and taxing land, agricultural produce, and trade (Merrey 1983). Above all, projects were 
designed to keep administrative and operational staff requirements as low as possible. Systems 
were intended to provide "equitable distribution (of water) without any interference by the canal 
'Director.  IlMl. Pakistan. 1-8  Danepur Road, Gor I,  Lahore. Pakistan. 
'Consultants  were employed to identify past levels of  expenditure as preparation for determining future needs. This paper 
is derived from the work (DAI 1984). which was performed under contram with USAID as part of  Irrigation Systems Man- 
agement Project No. 391  -0467, 
1- establishment - which is an important advantage to the irrigation community" (Clibborne 
1924146).  This laissez faire attitude toward canal operations, combined witn a design that 
required only minimal regulation, established the basis for today's relatively low involvement of 
government personnel in active system operations. 
Scope of Government Responsibility. In Pakistan, irrigation system O&M is the responsibility of 
the Provincial Irrigation Departments (PIDs). PID responsibility begins after water is diverted from 
the dams and terminates at the outlets to some 89,ooO watercourses which serve areas that vary 
in size from 80 - 280 hectares, and typically about 160 hectares. Compared to other Asian coun- 
tries, this is a relatively large area to be served by a single outlet. In  Thailand and Malaysia an 
outlet serves 50 - 80 hectares; Indonesia, 20 - 30  hectares; Sri Lanka, 12  - 16 hectares; Philip. 
pines, 10  hectares; Korea, 0.8 - 2 hectares; and Japan, 0.4 hectares. Thus, other factors being 
equal, irrigation department expenditures in Pakistan should be less than those in  other Asian 
cquntries. 
The costs reported in this study cover only those items for which the PlDs have responsibility 
(i.e.,  main system O&M). The Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) is responsible for 
planning and constructing storage and headworks facilities, and for O&M of major dams and 
power-generation works. Below the outlet, O&M is the responsibility of water users. 
FaciMies. PlDs operate and maintain three major types of facilities: irrigation canals, public 
tubewells, and drains and flood protection works. Besides these, PlDs also incur costs for main- 
taining and/or  operating canal roads, small hydro facilities, small dams, barrages, and workshops, 
and for several modest facilities where research programs are conducted. 
1. higation canal$. The irrigation network consists of 63,100 kilometers of unlined (alluvial) 
canals that command 14.25 million hectares (Table 1). of which 58% can be irrigated perennially 
and 42% c8n be irrigated only during the summer (kharif) season when the rivers are at peak flow. 
Canals vary from minors that carry 0.09 - 0.1  5 cubic meters of water per second (cumecs)  and 
serve 2 - 3  watercourses to canals the size of  rivers that transfer water between river basins and 
which have capacities up to 650 cumecs. Measured at the headworks, the canal irrigation system 
carries about 16 million hectare-meters (mhm)  per year. 
Table 1. Irrigation canals in Pakistan, 
Province  Total Length  Design (1  Command Area 
(million ha) 
Punjab  36,481  4.288  8.321 
Sind  21,192  .  3,544  5.101 
NWFP  2.772  176  ,446 
Baluchiston  2.655  135  ,384 
Total  63.100  8.143  14.252 
lkml  (cumecs) 
Source: 1982 and 1983 data from the PlDs 
By design, the number of control structures in  a canal was kept to a minimum; cross-regulators 
(checks)  were installed only where necessary to control operating water levels for the headworks 
of "offtaking"  channels. For example, in Sind the distance between regulators on main canals 
averages about 24  kilometers, about 16 kilometers on branch canals, and 32  kilometers on dis- 
tributaries. The lowest point in the system for regulation is at the headworks of distributaries, 
which often carry 6 - 9 cumecs. In practice, regulating flows in distributaries is not common. 
When water supply is insufficient, a system of scheduled canal closures and rotational operations 
between distributaries is initiated. Thus, canals either run  at full supply level (most of the year) or 
-2- are shut down entirely. Gates were not installed at the outlets (called moghas) but were designed 
to pass a specified quantity of water at the normal full-supply level. Moghas act as proportional 
flow dividers, each taking proportionately less when the canal level is lower than normal, and 
more when the supply level is high. The theory is that the entire system, from the main canal 
head-works down to the last outlet on the last minor, will operate in balance - provided the head 
inflow is close to normal full supply and the moghas are in good condition. 
This design obviates the need for operational changes common in many modern irrigation sys- 
tems. Essentially. the canal system functions like a drain. Because the irrigation system was 
designed to supply only 0.25 litres per second per hectare, farmers must apply a relatively high 
degree of water management in order to irrigate their entire holdings. Needing few operational 
changes and having few structures means the system can deliver water with relatively little 
investment in O&M. except that for major barrages which are at the headworks of main canals. 
2.  Public tubewells. Beginning in 1959, Pakistan made major investments in a series of salinity 
control and reclamation projects (SCARPS)  consisting of  a battery of tubewells of 0.03 - 0.1  5  cum- 
ecs capacity. SCARPs were constructed by WAPDA but are operated and maintained by the PlDs 
at considerable cost. Tubewells are used for two purposes: water table control and, where 
groundwater quality permits, supplemental irrigation. There are almost 13,000 public tubewells. 
with the majority in Punjab (Table 2). 
Table 2. Public tubewells in Pakistan. 











Total  12,993  0.952 
Source: 1982 and 1983 data from the PIDs. 
Public tubewells produce an estimated 0.95 million hectare-meters of water per year. Outside 
PID responsibility. about 90,OOO  private tubewells located within the canal command areas pump 
an additional estimated 3.1 mhm/yr. About 110,OOO.other  pumping schemes outside government 
irrigation commands produce about 0.24 mhm/yr. 
3.  Drains and flood control works. PlDs have responsibility for maintaining 15,079 kilometers of 
main, branch, and sub-branch drains (Table 3). Maintaining surface drains is a low priority. PlDs 
also maintain over 5,255 kilometers of flood protection works, including levtes (bunds) along riv- 
ers, and training bunds and spurs that protect facilities such as bridges. 
Maintenance Practices. Canals were designed with slopes and sections in regime to minimize 
scouring and silt deposits. But even though the irrigation systems carry a substantial load of silt 
which is discharged through the moghas and deposited on irrigated lands, major silt cleaning 
efforts are required each yeai. Annually, about 20% of the canals are scheduled for cleaning but 
lack of funds reduces this percentage. Perennial canals are maintained during a 2 - 3  week clo- 
sure between December and early February, and consists primarily of silt removal and bank shap- 
ing. Non-perennial canals are normatly shut down from mid-October to mid-April to provide a 
more flexible schedule of silt clearance and general maintenance. PlDs generally contract out silt 
removal and other labor-intensive maintenance activities. 
-3. Table 3  Surface drainsand flood control works 
Province  Design  Total Length  Flood Control 
Capacity  of Drains  Works 






991  6.068 
280  6.677 
104  2,173 
11  161 






Source:  1982 and 1983 data from the PIDs. 
Silt accumulation reduces channel cross-sectional area, which means that operating water lev- 
els must be raised to maintain design flows. A higher operating level leads to reduced freeboard, 
more bank overtopping and breaching, and generally increased maintenance costs. It also 
increases the flow through moghas at upstream locations, depriving farmers in the lower portions 
of the system of their fair share of the water and thereby creating a potential for equity problems 
between top-end users and bottom-end users. 
During periods of peak water delivery, very little direct operation of the system is required and 
the major work effort is  directed toward maintaining canal banks. Additional patrolling and main- 
tenance is done to guard against overtopping or breaching of the banks. Emergency repairs often 
involve farmers and small contractors as well as PID personnel. 
Whereas PtD costs for surface water supply are largely for maintenance activities,  PD  costs for 
groundwater (tubewells) are about 75% operational - primarily electricity charges - and 25% main- 
tenance, which includes repairs to motors, pumps, and wells. 
Characteristics of the Irrigation Bureaucracy 
Structure and  Size ofrhe Provincialhigation Departmenfs. PlDs are large, hierarchically struc- 
tured, and labor-intensive organizations, and their responsibility for irrigation water delivery is cor- 
respondingly highly centralized. In each provinc'e, PlDs receive water from the dams and deliver it 
to the moghas without relinquishing control to any other intermediary water agencies. The con- 
trast in nianagement responsibility with some other large gravity flow systems is sharp. For exam- 
ple, while Punjab irrigates 8.32 million hectares through a single entity, California delivers water 
to 3.8 million irrigated hectares through a decentralized network of 244 water districts (DWR 
1983).  * 
Figure 1 is an organizational chart for a PID. The chief executive officer is the Secretary, who is 
assisted by a secretariat. Next in line are one or more Chief Engineers (CE). depending on the size 
of the department. A CE  usually supervises three to  six Superintending Engineers (SE), each with 
a supporting staff. The organization under the command of an SE together with the area served is 
called a "Circle."  The Circle is divided into Divisions (usually 3-5). with each Division under the 
authority of an Executive Engineer (XEN). Reporting to  XENs are Sub-Divisional Officers (SDOs), 
positions normally held by Assistant Engineers. The day-to-day field work is  carried out at the div- 
isional level and below. All levels above the Division provide administration or support. 
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Notes: CE - Chief engineer; SE - Superintending engineer; XEN - Executive engineer; SDO  - Sub-divisional offlcer (assist- 
ant engineer); SEN .  Sub-engineer. All levels above division are administrative or  support staff; those below are field staff. 
Without exception, all grades from Assistant Engineer and.above require an engineering degree. 
Most of the officer positions are held by civil engineers, although there are a few mechanical and 
electrical engineers assigned to specialized functions, such as SCARP projects and major work- 
shops. Expertise and degree training in management, finance, or economics are not substitutes for 
the engineering degree if one is to  occupy any position of authority in the PIDs. 
Pakistan's irrigation bureaucracy is  enormous. The Punjab PID has more than 50,000 
employees. In contrast, the United States Bureau of Reclamation currently has about 7,500 
employees. More than 80.000  individuals were employed by the four PlDs in 1983/84 (Table 4). In 
aggregate, this is about one employee per watercourse or one employee per 88  - 216 irrigated 
hectares, depending on the province. Bottrall(1981) notes that the ratio in other Asian countries 
ranges from one employee per 122 - 496 irrigated hectares. 
In Punjab. almost 40% of the total work force is assigned to  canal irrigation, followed by 26% 
who  work with tubewells, 15% in the special revenue group (whose function is to assess water 
charges). and 6% who work with drainage. The remaining 13% is assigned to administration or to 
a number of less labor-intensive categories such as dams, flood control, hydrology, hill torrents, 
land reclamation. waterlogging and salinity, workshops,  research, design, stores, water treaty, and 
water allocation. 
5- Table 4. Staffing levels for Provincial Irrigation Departments. 
Position or 
Pay Equivalent 
.  Numbers of  Staff 
Punjab  Sind  NWFP Baluchistan 
sou1  )f lr 
Secretary  1  1  1 
Chief Engineer  13  7  1 
Superintending Engineer  47  26  7 
Executive Engineer  145  87  20 
Sub-enginear  2.312  873  208 
Sub-divisional Officer  574  246  64 
Sub-total. Officers  3.092  1,240  301 
Other Staff  47,185  22.466  4.731 
Total Staff  50.277  23,706  5,032 











Source  PID and non-development budget (NDB) figuresfor 1983/84 
ome to PlDs 
Recurrent and  Non-Recurrent Budgets. PlDs receive funding for recurrent or operational expen- 
ditures throu  h Provincial Finance Department allocations contained in the non-development 
budget (NDB) . The NDB is  the only source of revenue to support direct O&M costs, salaries and 
administration associated with those expenditures, and administration of the irrigation 
bureaucracy. 
3 
Each year's budget allocation to the PlDs is based upon the physical characteristics and inven- 
tory of the irrigation facilities against which are applied "yardsticks" developed by the PID and 
sanctioned by the Finance Department. For example, the Punjab PID receives USS600 per year for 
each kilometer of main and branch canal with a discharge greater than 300 cubic meters per 
second. Allocations for other categories of canals also depend on length and discharge capacity. 
SCARPS  draw allocations on the basis of number of wells, discharge, and pumping lift. Flood con- 
trol and drainage works are rated on the basis of length (in  kilometers)  and bed width, barrages 
and headworks on discharge capacity, dams per individual facility, and buildings per criteria set by 
the Buildings Department. Thus, the basis for budget allocations is rigidly fixed and based on for- 
mulas most of which were developed decades ago. 
NDB budget categories are divided into broad groupings such as repairs and maintenance, oper- 
ations (in the case of tubewells), machinery and equipment, salaries and  allowances, utilities, and 
other staff-associated budget items. Because the allocation is not for a specific job nor by func- 
tional category (e.g.,  canals and  tubewells). the breakdown is not conducive to  job-cost accounting. 
However, it does allow PID managers broad scope in using funds for a variety of O&M functions. 
PlDs also receive funding from the Provincial Annual Development Plan (ADP) for development 
works, new  construction, or non-recurrent project-related expenditures. The current irrigation sys- 
tem rehabilitation project that funds deferred maintenance is "budgetarily"  a non-recurrent item, 
and funding for it is  channeled to  the PlDs through the  ADP. 
Water Charges. Water charges are based on cropped area and on the type of crop. For example, 
water charges for sugarcane and orchards are more than three times those for grains and pulses that 
3Afour-year review (1980-84) of  NDB allocations tothe PlDs In each of Pakistan's four provinces provlded the basis foi 
cost information presented in this paper 
-6 use less water. The rate for water delivered from tubewells and lift schemes is  double that for 
gravity canals. Water charges are assessed against the cropped area of each field at the beginning 
of the growing season. At the end of the season, adjustments are made for crop failures. Water 
charges average between USS5.00 and USS7.50 per hectare/crop, and it is estimated that water 
charges represent about .6%  of the net income per hectare derived from crops produced. 
In the early development of the irrigation network, farmers who owned lands that benefitted 
from irrigation were expected to pay for the costs Of  operating, maintaining, and repairing the sys- 
tem. As a result, irrigation proved to be a lucrative government activity. In 1927/28, one-third of 
the Punjab provincial revenues were derived from irrigation department profits (Merrey 1983:130). 
Receipts from water charges generally exceeded O&M expenditures but, in  the early 1970s, PID 
expenditures for O&M escalated sharply because PlDs were forced to assume the operating costs 
of SCARP tubewells. Presently, cost recovery from water charges falls far short of O&M require- 
ments. Expressed as a percentage of O&M expenditures, revenues from water charges were: Pun- 
jab, 62% (1983/84); Sind, 49% (1982/83); and NWFP. 24% (1982/83). 
PlDs participate in  assessing water charges through their cadres of revenue officials. However, 
collection is the responsibility of the Revenue Departments. Monies raised through water charges 
pass into the provincial treasuries along with other tax revenues, thereby losing their distinctive 
source identification. PID budgets are allocated by provincial governments as part of the normal 
budgetary process. Because provincial treasuries are the direct source of PID funds and not water 
charges directly, PlDs are accountable upward to the administrative authority, the provincial gov- 
ernor. In contrast, if water charges were collected and retained by the PlDs as their primary source 
of financing, there could be increased PID accountability downward to the farmers. Lack of 
accountability to the farmer/water-user affects the perceived quality of service, because PlDs can 
be fully accountable without interacting with farmers who, in turn, can perceive the service they 
receive as less than satisfactory. 
Because present water charge rates are considered low compared to the farmers' ability to pay, 
one frequently discussed solution is to raise water charges to close the gap between recovery and 
expenditures. Another proposal is to relieve the PlDs from the responsibility and costs of O&M for 
SCARP s,  and to turn tubewell operations over to the private sector. This may be a valid approach 
for some areas of Punjab where groundwater qualityis good, but it is less appropriate where 
water pumped from SCARP tubewells is too saline for irrigation. Under such conditions, farmers 
will not assume responsibility for the wells. 
Expenditures for Irrigation System O&M 
Allocation for O&M.  Allocations for all PID activit'ies were broken into  five categories: canals, 
public tubewells, surface'drainage and flood control. establishment, and other. An analysis of 
expenditures by category and province is presented in  Table 5.  Although a four-year period was 
analyzed, dollar figures in the table are only for 1983/84. After 1980/81, expenditures for irriga- 
tion O&M increased annually by about 20 - 22%. double the rate of inflation. Increases were a 
response to agreements between Pakistan and the World Bank for the irrigation rehabilitation pro- 
ject which mandated greater expenditures for O&M. 
Depending on the province, 50  ~  60% of a PID's budget goes for repair, maintenance, or opera- 
tions of canals and tubewells. From 30 - 40% goes to establishment, or to those salary, allowance 
and administrative costs associa:sd  with operation of the bureaucracy. Staff salaries and allowan- 
ces range from 28 - 33% of the PID budget. 
7- Table 5. Expenditure and percentage allocations to the PlDs for O&M. 
Punjab  Sind  NWFP  Ealuchistan 
uss  %  uss  %  uss  %  uss  % 
Canals  12.1  1611.4  37  4.4  39  3.4  54 
Public Tubewells  43.9  45  5.6  18  1.7  14  - 
Drainige & Flood Control  3.6  3  3.4  4  1.4  15  0.3  4 
Establishment  30.4  36  17.3  36  3.0  32  2.4  39 
Other  0.3  *  3.6"  5  -  -  0.2  3 
Total  90.3  100 41.3  100 10.5  lo0  6.3  100 
'  less than 1%; x  includes major allocations for O&M of three large barrages on the 
lndus which serve as the headworks for the irrigation system in Sind. Expenditures 
for  1983/84  allocations;  data  in US$ millions (Conversion  rate,  Spring  1984: 
USSl.DQ=Rs  13/40), Percentages are averages of four  years.  1981-84. Approxi- 
mately 75%  of "Public Tubewell"  expenditures are for electricity, and 25%  for repair 
and maintenance of pumps and motors. "Establishment" includes salary and allo- 
wances. administration of the headquarters units. buildings, transport, telephone, 
and utilities. "Other" includes small dams,  research, design, and land reclamation. 
Source: data from the PIDs. 
In three provinces, expenditures for canal maintenance were greater than for tubewell opera- 
tion. Punjab differs from the other provinces in  that it uses its SCARP tubewells primarily for irri- 
gation not drainage, and thus operates its wells for more hours than dces Sind or NWFP. Conse- 
quently, expenditures for electrical charges for tubewell operations and repairs and maintenance 
to pumps and motorlaccounts  for 45% of the Punjab PID budget. If a fair portion of the establish- 
ment cost pool is allocated to tubewells, their O&M consumes 56% of the PID budget4. 
Between 1970/71 and 1982/83,  the Punjab PID increased expenditures for tubewell O&M at 
an  annual rate of 67%, or more than ten times the rate of expenditures for other forms of O&M 
which increased at 6% per year over the same period  Because Punjab encountered sharply escal- 
ating cost obligations for O&M of SCARP tubewells, and Finance Department allocations have not 
kept pace, the Punjab PID diverted funds from other portions of its O&M budget which were forced 
to operate on residual funds. Thus the SCARP tubewell program has had an unintended impact 
upon canals, surface drains, and  flood control works leading to an accumulation of deferred 
maintenance. 
At the other extreme in PID Driorities is the allocation of resources for surface drainage. Less 
than 4%, or USS0.42 - USS0.62 per hectare, is spent on maintaining suface drainage although inade- 
quate drainage at depths less than 1.5 meters affects over 2.4 million hectares. Pakistan is cur- 
rently investing in  a major drainage artery - the Left Bank Outfall Drain - but this is a development 
and not  an O&M expenditure. 
There is little support within the Provincial Finance Departments  for raising PID allocations for 
O&M. The fact that water charges have been set low and recoveries through water charges do not 
meet expenditures is  an argument used to slow the rate of increase in allocation for O&M. 
Cost of Irrigation Services. The cost of irrigation services including water delivery, flood control, 
drainage activities, and establishment was computed on the basis of 1983/84 NDB allocations to 
4Commenting on the failure of the SCARPS  to achieve drainage objectives. the lead editorial in the Pakistan Times (1 1 
October 1984)  surmised that the tubewells "drained crores (tens of millions) of rupees and little else." 
-8- the PIDs. The command area and water delivery statistics were furnished by the PIDs. O&M costs 
for SCARP tubewells and for the portion of establishment costs associated with tubewell opera- 
tions have been separated from O&M costs for canals, drains, and flood control works. Table 6 
shows the cost of irrigation services for canal and tubewell deliveries. 
Table 6. Cost of irrigation services for canals and tubwells. 
Province  Canals  Tubewells  Overall 
US$ per hectarelyear 
Puniab  4.81  22.77  10.74 
sind 
NWFP 
6.30  7 76 
18.50  49.77  23.31 
Baluchistan  20 73  n/a  20.73 




0.09  1  .oo  0.19 
0.09  0.75  0.10 
0.32  0.99  0.38 
Source: 1983/84 data from the PlDs. 
In 1983184. Pakistan spent USS148.4 million dollars or USS10.34 per hectare for O&M for its 
irrigation systems. For the “average”  hectare, approximately USS3.72 was spent on salary, allo- 
wances, and administration, leaving USS6.62 to be spent principally on operation of public tube- 
wells or on repairs and maintenance of canals, tubewells, drains, and flood control works. 
In the major irrigated areas, Punjab and Sind, the costs associated with providing canal irriga- 
tion water are extremely low, USSO.09 per hectare-meter respectively - about one-third to one- 
quarter of that in NWFP where irrigation works are much smaller. Annual expenditures for canal 
O&M including establishment costs were USS900 and USS1.490 per kilometer of canal for Punjab 
and Sind, respectively. Low expenditures can be attributed to several factors: 1)  irrigation O&M 
responsibility that is limited to above the outlet and below the headworks; 2) the size and Scale Of 
major delivery channels; 3)  the design of the system that requires few, if any, operational changes; 
and, paradoxically, 4) an inadequate level of maintenance activities which has led to an accumula- 
tion of deferred maintenance needs. 
The annual cost to operate a public tubewell in Punjab was USS6.250;  in Sind it was USS2,OI’O. 
The difference in  cost is attributable to longer operating hours per well in Punjab. Public tubewell 
supplied water costs of USS0.75 - USSI .OO  per hectare-meter versus USSO.09 - 0.32 per hectare- 
meter for canal-supplied irrigation water. On a volume basis, tubewell water is four times the cost 
of canal water in NWFP, 8 times the cost in Sind. and 16 times the cost in Punjab. However, in 
most locations public tubewells have a dual purpose: drainage plus water for irrigation. Thus, it is 
not strictly correct to compare canal water costs with those of public tubewells for irrigation 
supply alone. Furthermore,. the fact that many private individuals have made investments in tube- 
wells is an indicator that farmers realize additional benefits and thus are willing to incur additional 
costs in order to operate and control deliveries from their own wells. 
The cost data presented.here are accurate for Pakistan. However, any attempt to make cross 
comparisons with other studies or to apply these data to other locations should be approached 
with caution because of the physical differences in  the irrigation systems, and differences in the 
institutional structures, methods of cost accounting, and wage rates between countries. 
-9 Implications and Conclusions 
The preceding review highlights several important policy-related issues that can be mentioned 
both by way of summary and to generate further analysis and comment. 
1. SCARPs have eroded PID ability to perform other maintenance functions, especially in Pun- 
jab. Divesting tubewells to the private sector is seen by many as a solution in areas with fresh 
groundwater. But unless private well operators improve operating efficiency and provide more 
timely and reliable water supplies, divestiture is likely to fail because private individuals will not 
assume O&M costs that have proven so burdensome to the PIDs. The SCARP Transition Pilot Pro- 
ject is designed to test the feasibility of divestiture. 
Given the extent of Pakistan's drainage problems, decisions must be reached between alterna- 
tives in three areas: a) vertical vs. horizontal drainage facilities, b) SCARPs vs;  open or tile drains, 
and c) low capital/high  O&M costs vs.  high capital/low  O&M  costs. Because of such factors as 
pumping salt-laden groundwater without adequate provision for disposal to the ocean, the marked 
increase in energy costs, and the impact on residual maintenance caused by the SCARP program, 
a return to horizontal drainage may be the most economical and effective approach in  the long 
run. A thorough review is warranted. 
2. Because provincial governments provide O&M funding and not water charges directly, PID 
accountability is upward to the governor and not downward to the farmers. Similarly, PID respon- 
sibility is to deliver water to the 89,000 outlets, and not to the 3.6 million farmer water-users. 
PlDs can be fiscally accountable and fully responsible in their work and yet have minimal interac- 
tion with farmers, who often feel that the irrigation service they receive is not satisfactory. 
Irrigation operations and farmer perceptions could be improved simultaneously by bringing PlDs 
into clwer contact with farmers by extending PID responsibility beyond the outlet ("reach down"). 
This could be achieved by increasing the number of moghas and thereby reducing the size of 
outlet service areas. An alternative approach ("reach up") is to strengthen water user groups so 
that farmer representatives could eventually interact with the PlDs regarding O&M issues. Water 
users are already organizing along many watercourses in Punjab and Sind. An extension of the 
"reach up" approach could be to test the utility of a farmer-controlled intermediary water agency 
at the distributary level. The PID could wholesale water to the agency which would then sell it to 
farmers. The agency would be responsible and accountable to the water users for O&M functions. 
3. Common to all these approaches to irrigation management is a need for more interaction and 
better communication between farmers and the PIDs. Such interaction is required if flexibility in 
main system water delivery scheduling is a future objective of irrigation planning, particularly 
because increased flexibility is seen by many as a prerequisite for better agricultural performance 
from the lndus irrigationsystem. 
System design changes will also be necessary to obtain more flexibility. A program could be 
devised to permit action research on scheduling canal water deliveries that are more in line with 
crop water requirements. This would require increased canal capacities in two or three minors 
and along a series of adjacent watercourses so that accommodations in  surface water delivery 
scheduling might be tested on apilot basis. 
4. Pakistan spends USS150 million dollars per year for O&M and has a deferred maintenance 
program of USS1 18 million dollars spread over 5 years. This investment will correct some of the 
principal deferred maintenance deficiencies. It is conceivable that doubling annual O&M alloca- 
tions could restore the i.rrigation system to design level. With increases in allocations of that mag- 
nitude, O&M expenditures would still be low (about USS20 per hectare/year) when compared 
with similar  expenditures reported for  other  countries  in Asia.  Pakistan's  expenditures for 
- 10. O&M can be kept relatively low because of a) the design of the lndus irrigation system, and partic- 
ularly the scale of major canals; b) the fact that few operational changes are required; and, c) the 
practice of delivering water only to outlets which serve large areas. But these same factors which 
keep O&M expenditures low are also the key water constraints to increasing the productivity of 
irrigated agriculture. The design and management of the system intercedes, causing insufficient 
capacity, apparent lack of flexibility in main system management, and inability to make operational 
changes in the pattern of irrigation delivery. 
What will be the impact of better system maintenance upon agricultural productivity?  Probably, 
not much. Low productivity is unlikely to be corrected by doubling O&M expenditures. O&M pre- 
serves the capacity of the irrigation system as it was designed and is currently used. Increased 
investment in  O&M doesn't address inherent design and management limitations which, along 
with a lack of agricultural inputs, more directly constrains agricultural performance. Thus, while 
better O&M is needed and increased financial support is  justified, neither is a substitute for 
improvements indesign and management. Nevertheless, with a major new dam scheduled for 
completion in the 1990s and the potential to extend irrigation to new areas, Pakistan should now 
be experimenting with design innovations and changes in operation of the lndus system. 
-11. THE LOCAL IMPACT OF CENTRALIZED IRRIGATION CONTROL IN PAKISTAN: 
A SOCIO-CENTRIC PERSPECTIVE 
Douglas J.  Merrey' 
The body of  accumulating knowledge on civilizational growth in the past (and in the 
present?)  testifies to the instability rather than the stability of large-scale socio-natural 
systems and the increasing uncertainty, rather than control, resulting from technoeco- 
nomic growth (Bennett 1976:147). 
Introduction 
Investment in irrigation to increase agricultural production has been a very important economic 
development strategy in many regions of the world for thousands of years. In ancient times, large 
scale publicly constructed and mangged irrigation systems were fundamental to the existence of 
centralized states in Mesopotamia, China, India, Sri Lanka, Egypt, and Mexico. In modern times, 
both developed natiops and the poorer developing countries assisted by international donors are 
investing heavily in irrigation development. It is hoped that this will lead to higher agricultural pro- 
duction, development of industries and markets, generation of revenues for the state, and 
improved well-being for the beneficiaries. Although such investments in new construction con- 
tinue, there is increasing concern among both developing country governments and international 
donors that the investments in irrigation are not providing economic returns at the rates assumed 
during project planning. Far more attention is therefore being given to questions of how  to 
improve irrigation system management and productivity, and how to increase the rate of cost rec- 
overy from beneficiaries in response to the spiraling recurrent costs of irrigation systems. 
One of the first efforts in modern time$ to use massive irrigation investments to promote eco- 
nomic development was the construction by the British of large scale irrigation systems in India, 
particularly Punjab. in the 19th and 20th centuries. The British were pioneers and developed 
many of the technical criteria used in irrigation design today. They were relatively successful in 
constructing very large irrigation systems in a timely manner without major cost overruns. Con- 
struction was financed by raising funds in private markets and paying off the investors using funds 
generated from high irrigation fees charged to the water users. Huge tracts of land in what is 
presently Punjab in  Pakistan were transformed from sparsely populated deserts and herding 
grounds into heavily settled intensively cultivated areas. For several decades in  the early 20th cen- 
tury, Punjab was a major exporter of food and fiber. 
Pakistan today is among the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita income in 1982  of 
under USS400 (World Bank 1985). Agricultural productivity is very low by world standards or 
compared to its potential. From the late 1940s until the early 1980s. Pakistan had to import about 
25% of its annual wheat requirements and as much as 90% of its cooking oils. The Government of 
Pakistan, with assistance from international donors, has been investing billions of dollars in 
upgrading, extending, and improving the irrigation system it inherited from the British colonial 
government, and such massive infusions of aid will continue for the forseeable future. 
Until recently these investments were predicated on the assumption that the problems are 
primarily technical and thus purely technical solutions are required. With hindsight, there is 
widespread agreement that the return on these investments has been less than anticipated. Some 
~~  ~ 
'Social Scientist. International Irrigation Management Institute, Digana Village via  Kandy, Sri Lanka. 
-12- recent development programs do address organizational issues but they are focused at the local 
level on promoting water users associations and involve very limited tinkering with the local 
organization of the system. This limited approach is unfortunate because it seems increasingly 
clear that the problems are fundamentally organizational and political and not exclusively - or even 
primarily - technical. Thus, as argued by Spooner (1  984), a ”socio-centric” theoretical approach 
which takes account of the centrality of human activity is essential if the problems are to be 
clearly identified and appropriate solutions formulated. 
This paper’  analyzes changes in local resource management strategies and the environmental 
impact of centralized irrigation management in the lndus Basin since the mid-19th century. These 
changes are viewed primarily as responses to increasing interventions of the state, and the co- 
opting through centralization of what had been local functions by higher level bodies. This in turn 
has led to an inability to respond to local level problems before they reach crisis proportions. To 
interpret the trends and identify key problems and issues, the paper draws upon a systems theory 
model of the evolution of the state that was originally developed by scholars interested in the dem- 
ise of Mesopotamian civilization. The analysis provides the basis for a short critique of present 
development programs and for identifying several key research questions. 
Pakistan’s Irrigation System3 
The lndus Basin is a huge plain crossed by the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab. Sutlej, Ravi, and Beas 
rivers. The climate is arid to semi-arid, with low and extremely unreliable rainfall, thus necessitat- 
ing some form of irrigation as a basis for stable agriculture. Since implementing the lndus Waters 
Treaty in 1960, Pakistan has used water from the three western rivers (Indus. Jhelum, Chenab). 
while India diverts most of the flow of the other three. The flood plains are subject to monsoon 
flooding. The higher land between the rivers was covered by grassy and woody vegetation before 
the construction of the canals, but today it is intensively cultivated. 
The British began planning canal projects even before formally annexing the Punjab in 1849. 
The first canal -the  Upper Bari Doab - began irrigating in 1861. Thereafter, the British continued 
building increasingly sophisticated and large-scale canals until the end of their rule. Since 1947. 
Pakistan with the aid of international donors has remodeled, expanded, and integrated the sys- 
tems. Aside from several new canal projects, the Mangala and Tarbela dams have been con- 
structed, and huge link canals completed to carry water from the western to the eastern river beds 
and canals. These are today components of the largest single integrated irrigation system in the 
world. About 63.000  kilometers of canals and distributaries carry water to about 90,ooO water- 
courses, irrigation channels under farmers’ control that carry water to farmers’ lateral ditches and 
to their fields. About 14  million hectares are irrigated by the system. 
The system uses barrages, a device to divert water from the rivers into the canals. These are 
designed for continuous operation at or near full capacity. The amount of flow cannot be regulated 
on demand except within very narrow parameters. However, flow may be interrupted during floods 
or for canal repair. Water flows continuously from canals into distributaries, then through ungated 
concrete modular outlets (mogha) into watercourses,  and finally into farmers’ ditches and fields. 
’This  paper was inspired by two papers by  Susan Lees (1974a and b), in which she took a similar approach to analyzing 
local trends in water resource management in Oaxaca, Mexico; in one paper (1  974b) she notes specifically the similarity of 
processes in the lndus Basin. 
%his  section is based on the brief description of Pakistan’s irrigation system in Merrey (1982). See also Merrey(l983)  and 
Michel (1967). 
-13- The mogha is designed to deliver a fixed quantity of water when the canal is flowing at full capac- 
ity based on the area commanded. Although there is great variation in area irrigated and number 
of farmers, each watercoursecommands about 225 hectares cultivated by about 50 farmers. The 
Provincial Irrigation Department (PID) is responsible for operating and maintaining the system 
downward from the barrages to the mogha. The watercourse is legally the responsibility of the 
farmers who own land in the command area. 
Each farmer has the right to a quantity of water proportional to the size of his land holding. Usu- 
ally each farmer is allotted a period of time on a weekly rotation basis to take his share of water. 
Although these rotations were originally established by the farmers, most have been replaced by 
formal rotations devised by the PID. Farmers get water for a fixed period every week regardless of 
crop water requirements. Although water trading is illegal under formal rotations, it is common. 
The system was deliberately designed by the British to command the maximum area possible 
(about 140 hectares per cubic meter/second, or 0.21 liters per second/hectare) with a minimum 
of management necessary up to the mogha. Despite major remodeling at the macro level, canals 
are still operated according to principles established by the British. 
This description does not convey the magnitude of the engineering achievement that supports 
Pakistan's irrigated agriculture, sometimes referred to as the "lndus Food Machine."  The early 
British engineers were proud of their work, and that pride continues in Pakistan's PIDs. Neverthe- 
less, severe problems plague the system. 
Waterlogging and salinity problems date back to the first large canal constructed by the British 
in  the mid-19th century. Despite research, the British never seriously addressed this issue. They 
found it cheaper or more profitable to expand the system rather than embark on major efforts to 
solve problems. 
Following Independence in 1947, Pakistan discovered itself to be a food deficit country and had 
to import large quantities of wheat during the next 38  years.4 Studies during the 1950s and 
1960s5  clearly showed that the irrigation system faced a major crisis. Estimates suggested that 
20.000  - 40,000  hectares were going out of production annually from waterlogging and salinity. 
Indeed. the system's productivity has remained low compared to its demonstrable potential and 
compared to other countries with similar conditions. 
The combination of low productivity, food deficits, severe waterlogging and salinity, and Pakis- 
tan's general poverty have led to massive investments by donor countries since the 1950s to 
improve the irrigation system. For example, the United States Government's total investment up to 
1977 was About one billion dollars. Investments have been made in  dams, link canals, and large 
public tubewells to provide vertical drainage in  waterlogged and saline areas. Referred to as the 
Salinity Control and Reclamation Program (SCARP), these wells have had some impact in control- 
ling the water table and increasing cropping intensity by making more irrigation water available to 
farmers. But the program has proven so costly that questions are now being raised about continu- 
ing it.' 
,- 
4Pakistan has produced enough wheat to satisfy internal demand in only 2 of the past 38  years. Recently, the country has 
had to import US$  250 million of wheat during a period whan it could not sell its surplus cotton (remarks by a senior offi- 
cial from the Government of  Pakistan. 1985). 
5The most important are the "Revelle Report" (White House 19641  and Lieftinck et al. (1969). More recent development 
strategies are set out in WAPDA (1  979). which has been endorsed by all the major donors (see Peterson 1964). Johnson 
(1982) discusses ihese reports. 
'See  Johnson (1982). The number of private tubewells has expanded to an estimated 200,000 (Peterson 1984) 
- 14- In addition to continuing SCARP programs and constructing new canals such as the Chashma 
Right Bank, donors have recently invested large amounts in watercourse improvement programs, 
rehabilitation of major canals (deferred maintenance), and the Command Water Management 
(CWM)  scheme, which is an integrated rural development activity focuse& on irrigated agriculture. 
Present donor pledges total over USS1.15 billion, not including a left bank drain project and a new 
dam on the lndus (Peterson 1984:9-10). 
In order to implement these large projects, the Water and Power Development Authority 
(WAPDA) was established in 1958. Several foreign advisory reports since then have recom- 
mended even more centralized planning and management for better coordination (White House 
1964:179-84; Lieftinck et al. 1969:186-91). Based on such recommendations, donor pressures, 
and the bureaucracy's own predilections, all of the policies and solutions to Pakistan's irrigation 
problems since Independence  have shared the same characteristics: "an orientation toward purely 
technical solutions, designed and implemented from the top down, with the financial and advisory 
aid of foreign organizations, and an assumption that the 'experts' know best what the problems 
are and how to solve them"  (Merrey 198291  ).  The most fundamental problem has not been 
addressed how should the lndus irrigation system be organized and managed? 
Processes of Evolution: A General Systems Model 
The problems characterizing Pakistan's irrigation system are not unique, and the experience of 
other hydraulic societies suggests that concern about these problems is. not misplaced. Similar 
problems have had profound consequences  for large scale irrigation systems in the past. The 
dependence on a centrally managed canal irrigation system was as characteristic of ancient 
Mesopotamian civilization as it is of modern Pakistan. Despite technological innovations like 
power-driven tubewells and reinforced concrete dams, the same mechanisms, processes, and 
pathologies characterize the organization and development of both modern and ancient large 
systems. 
Conventional wisdom once said there was a direct relationship in ancient civilizations between 
successful irrigated agriculture and the presence of a strong stable central government (Wittfogel 
1957; Adam 1974; Jacobsen 1958). Only when government controls weakened did the irrigation 
system and the whole agricultural regime collapse. 
This argument was recently reversed. Gibson (1974:7)  argued that, "on the contrary, in Mesopo- 
tamia the intervention of state government has tended to weaken and ultimately destroy the agri- 
cultural basis of the country." Based on studies of a contemporary group in southern Iraq (Fernea 
1970). as well as on archeological data, Gibson hypothesized  that the cyclical rise and fall of king- 
doms in Mesopotamia from the 4th century BC to the present is not related to the breakdown of 
administration (this occurs later in  the cycle of decline). Instead, the cause can be attributed to 
state-managed irrigation projects that increased waterlogging and salinity and undermined long- 
term agricultural productivity, and, more deleterious, to government intervention at  the local level 
which violated the fallowing essential to maintaining agricultural productivity. This intervention 
had the same origins in  Mesopotamia as it has Pakistan: rising demand for food by growing urban 
populations and the need for revenues by the state. 
Whitcombe's (1  972) study of the disastrous impact of British irrigation schemes and agricultural 
policies in the Ganges River Valley (present-day Uttar Pradesh) shows that Mesopotamia is not an 
isolated case. The Ganges, Mesopotamian, and Pakistan systems share many features, which 
suggests these may be analyzed under one theoretical approach. 
Flannery (1972). building on Rappaport (1969 and 1.971)  and others, suggested a useful model 
based on systems theory to describe the evolution of the state. Flannery (ibid.:409) points out that 
- 15 - human societies may be regarded as one class of living system, and the state as a very complex 
system whose complexity can be measured by two processes: the degree of segregation, which is 
the “internal differentiation and specialization of subsystems,”  and the degree of centralization, 
which is the “linkage between the various subsystems and the highest order controls in  society.“ 
An explanation of the rise and decline of a state would focus on these two processes and their 
consequences. Furthermore, Flannery distinguishes among “processes.“  “mechanisms,“  and 
“socio-environmental  stresses.” He suggests that processes and mechanisms are universal char- 
acteristics of complex systems, while socio-environmental stresses which select for these pro- 
cesses vary over time and space. 
This paper focuses on one of Flannery’s processes (centralization), one mechanism by which 
centralization occurs (linearization), and two system pathologies (meddling and hyperintegration) 
which, in  conjunction with socio-environmental stresses, lead to progressively greater stress and 
instability of systems. 
Systems respond to stress by breaking down or changing (evolving); new institutions or control 
levels may emerge (segregation),  or higher-order controls may be extended and strengthened (cen- 
tralization). A mechanism by which these processes occur is linearization (ibid.:413), in which 
lower order controls are repeatedly or permanently by-passed by higher order controls, usually 
after the former have failed to maintain relevant variables within the proper range.7 An example 
offered by Flannery is when central authorities take over local irrigation regulation from local 
institutions. 
Linearization may lead to evolutionary change but it may also lead to new problems (ibid.). For 
example, linearization often destroys the intervening controls which buffer one subsystem from 
the perturbations of another. Such internal changes may lead to systemic pathologies which sub- 
ject the system to further stresses leading to progressively greater centralization - “the process is 
one with many positive loops.“  Pathologies include meddling, which means “to subject directly to 
a higher order control the variables ordinarily regulated by lower order controls,“  and hyperinte- 
gration,’  which refers to the over-integration of a system. This is a highly centralized and tnere- 
fore potentially very unstable condition which results from the breakdown of the autonomy of sub- 
systems and their tight integration, such that change or perturbation in  one rapidly and directly 
affects the others (ibid.:42O).Thus,  in this multi-variant model, 
we might see the state evolving through a long process of centralization and segrega- 
tion; brought about by countless promotions and linearizations, in response not only to 
stressful  socio-environmental  conditions  but also  to  stress  brought  on  by  internal 
pathologies (ibid.:41  4).9 
Flannery‘s intention was to contribute to developing a generative model for the origin and evolu- 
tion of state systems. However, the model’s relevance is not limited to ancient civilizations. For 
example, Lees (1  974a and b) used Flannery’s and Rappaport’s models to discuss the increasing 
involvement of the government of modern Mexico in local irrigation systems in the Valley of Oax- 
aca. Government intervention (meddling) in formerly independent local irrigation systems led to 
increased agricultural  productivity in the short run but also to insensitivity to local conditions. 
’Flannery  11972) does not consider a Situation in which higher levels of the system change the expectatiosn or  standards 
for iudging lower order controls 1e.g.. when the State presses for rapid increases in production). 
‘Flannery  (1  972) uses both “hyperintegration”  and “hypercoherenece.” 
g”Promotion” refersto a process where an institution may rise to a higher level in a control hierarchy or a new institution 
may emerge from one of the roles of an existing institution. 
- 16- hyperintegration among the various subsystems. Lees suggested that the system was potentially 
unstable, and increasing environmental degradation as a result of the state's intervention would 
lead to  diminishing returns  from investment in hydraulic development. The short-run response to 
this degradation (mainly decreasing availability of water) has been further centralization: higher 
order controls have been strengthened as increasingly sophisticated and expensive technology 
has been required to extract more water from the environment. However, this centralization, as in 
Mesopotamia, leads to further degradation; "centralization will not correct the disturbance to the 
system but may exacerbate it"  (Lees 1974b:174). 
Lees observed that so far only short-term processes are observable in the contemporary Oaxaca 
system. Since the lndus Basin system has been in  operation for only 130  years. relatively little 
time has passed from an evolutionary standpoint. Nevertheless, the system has grown rapidly and 
trends are emerging. The mechanisms, processes, and pathologies that constitute Flannery's 
model appear to characterize Pakistan's irrigation system. Therefore, analyzing the problems from 
the perspective of a systems model should provide important insights. 
Because my original research focused on a particular village community in historical perspec- 
tive, data are available on local management strategies and social organization. To date, however, 
there has been little research on the larger bureaucratic organizations that control the irrigation 
system. Thus, the remainder of this paper analyzes local level data using Flannery's (1  972) sys- 
tem's model, and raises questions about the larger system to be addressed through further 
research. 
Changing Resource Management Strategies in Gondalpur" 
The Pre-Canal Period. Gondalpur (a pseudonym) is a village located about five kilometers from 
the Jhelum River, on the Chaj Doab, the interfluve between the Jhelum and Chenab Rivers. Politi- 
cally, Gondalpur is in southern Gujrat District (Punjab) and borders Sargodha District. Since 1904, 
its land has been irrigated by water from the Lower Jhelum Canal (WC).  Although there are many 
colony villages"  in  the region, Gondalpur is an older village that predates the canal system. His- 
torically, this region has been a backwater and not a center of political or cultural developments in 
Punjab. 
At the time of the first British survey in 1857, Gondalpur had 67 inhabitants. Subsistence was 
based primarily on about 100 head of cattle, supplemented by agriculture on about 19 hectares of 
rainfed cultivation, with an additional 7.3 hectares irrigated by a recently constructed Persian 
wheel well."  The inhabitants were recent settlers on this land, though some claimed to trace 
their genealogy many generations back to a founder whose name is the real name of the village 
today. The cattle herders on the uplands had very close symbiotic relations with the people in the 
flood plains, where settled populations practiced intensive irrigated agriculture, and where a 
number of small towns were located. 
On the active flood plain, which is  flooded during the summer monsoon, wheat and other crops 
were cultivated on the residual moisture during the winter. On the less active portions of the flood 
plain, the water table was fairly high (9 - 15 meters), and there were a large number of Persian 
~~  ~~  ~  ~~ 
'?his  section is based on data presented in Merrey (1983: Chap. IV-VI). 
l1  New settlements created as part of the canal development project in which people from East Punjab were settled. 
'2A Persian wheel well is a continuous chain of pots or  buckets for raising water from a well using animal power. 
-17- wheel wells used  for irrigation. There were also inundation canals which carried summer flood 
Waters to land away from the rivers, enabling an irrigated summer crop on the inactive flood plain. 
The wells were owned by individuals or small groups of people; the inundation canals were 
generally constructed and managed by local landlords with control over the requisite capital and 
manpower. However, the British survey in  the middle of the 19th  century, which followed a long 
period of political and economic uncertainty. indicated that most of the inundation canals were not 
operational. Gondalpur itself is located on the crest separating the upland from the flood plain. Its 
one Persian wheel well was marginal because the water table was almost too low  (1  7 meters) for 
the lift technology of the period. 
Local resources were controlled at the local level during the pre-British period. In Gondalpur, 
and indeed in most of Punjab, there were no large scale public works such as state-controlled 
canal systems. Although empires based in Lahore sometimes were able to  extract tribute from the 
Gondalpur area through local centers of power, but  this was probably not done consistently even 
during the height of the Mughal Empire. 
With the extension of direct British rule, all this changed. The British carried out detailed sur- 
veys of land, people, and resources, and demarcated land into individual revenue villages (mauzaJ. 
Within each mauza individual holdings were demarcated in order to clearly define and record 
responsibilities for payment of land revenue to the state. This process of defining and assigning 
rights is  called settlement. The settlement process in Gondalpur created a village community with 
a legal basis where none had existed before. It created a brotherhood of land proprietors sharing 
an  official genealogical charter, and provided brotherhood members with individual rights of land. 
The differential possession of land rights and the exclusion of a significant portion of the commun- 
ity from such rights created a totally new basis for social relationships and social differentiation. It 
also initiated the process of centralization because a higher level and rather remote entity (from 
the point of vi'ew  of Gondalpur's residents) took over the right to regulate land use. As part of this 
process, land not assigned to individuals became government land and the government then res- 
tricted the right to graze cattle or cultivate on its land. This centralization of control over land use 
rights, in conjunction with other factors, had a profound impact on local resource management 
strategies. 
The restrictions on use of land not one's own and assignment of land rights to specific individu- 
als or the state, along with other changes at the time (e.g.,  relative peace, increases in inter- 
regional trade, population growth), led to a shift in the uplands from semi-nomadic cattle herding 
supplemented by casual agriculture to a great expansion in rainfed agriculture and attempts to 
expand irrigated agriculture. Before the end of the 19th century, two more Persian wheel wells 
had been constructed in Gondalpur, although one of them never worked well because of the low 
water table. As part of this process, tenancy relationships became more formalized, and about 
50% of the land was cultivated by tenants by about 1900. 
More serious in the long run, speculators began purchasing, land in anticipation of the canal 
being built. This occurred during a period in the 1890s  when there was a series of local droughts 
and epidemics, forcing villagers to sell land in order to  survive. As a result, on the eve of the intro- 
duction of canal irrigation, over half of the land in Gondalpur was controlled by town-based land- 
lords living outside of GondalpJr. Overall, the contrast between the upland and flood plain adap- 
tive strategies had nearly disappeared, with the rapid population increase and the agricultural 
intensification on the uplands. However, upland agriculture, being primarily rainfed, was far more 
unstable and uncertain than flood plain cultivation. 
On the flood plains, there was also a process of agricultural intensification, through construc- 
tion of more Persian wheel wells and more inundation canals. The British made it public policy 
during this period to encourage private investment in such improvements, including inundation 
canals. One can say,  then, that until about 1900 in this region, water resources continued to be 
18 locally managed and controlled, as a matter of public policy and fact. However, as a state whose 
finances were dependent on revenues from cultivated land, the British colonial government had 
centralized control over land, providing specific rights to certain persons over specific plots of land, 
and reserving a large portion of the land completely under government control. 
The P~st-CanalPeriod..’~  Construction of the Lower Jhelum Canal (WC)14 was begun in 1897, 
and completed in 1917. Irrigation began along the upper reaches ohhe  canal in 1901. In 1904. 
Gondalpur began receiving irrigation water. Today the net command area of the WC is about 
628.000 hectares. Maximum design discharge at  the head (Rasul Barrage) is 151 cubic meters per 
second (cumecs)  or about 0.24 liters per second/hectare. Actual discharges vary widely by season 
and year, and often exceed the maximum when sufficient water is available (Bonrall 1978:4-8). 
Developments during the decades before 1904 had prepared the residents of Gondalpur and its 
region for irrigation, because the response was immediate - within just a few years - the area cul- 
tivated in the village more than doubled and all of it was irrigated. The immediate impact of the 
introduction of canal irrigation was not radical. Rather, it intensified trends already evident during 
the pre-canal period: increa ing dependence on agriculture with a continuation of a mixed rather 
than a mono-cropping strate  1’  y,  a shift from grazing to stall feeding animals using fodder crops and 
residues from grain crops, an increasingly complex and hierarchical community social structure, 
and retention of a basically subsistence orientation toward farming. The laner occurred despite 
the (forced) necessity of growing more cash crops to pay land revenue, irrigation fees, various  . 
illicit charges levied by the bureaucracy, and to buy a basic necessities. 
However. the eventual impact of the introduction of canal irrigation was profound, radically 
changing the environment, local social structure, resource management strategies, and relation- 
ship of the villagers with institutions and forces outside the community. Of these, the impact of 
changes on land and water control in the flood plain and the uplands, appear to be responses 
primarily to increasing centralization through linearization and pathological tendencies toward 
meddling and hypercoherence. 
Despite post-Independence legal changes ostensibly designed to protect tenants’ rights, and two 
anempts at land reform, there have been no drastic changes in  land laws during the 20th century 
which have a major impact on land use in Gondalpur, with two qualifications. One is  that the 
threat of land reform laws has led large landlords to move tenants around more, lest they develop 
squatters’ rights, and, in recent years, some tenants have been turned into daily wage laborers or 
annually engaged agricultural servants on land directly managed by the landlord. The other partial 
exception is the impact of land consolidation laws. The government attempted to implement a land 
consolidation scheme in Gondalpur in 1977, with very mixed results. 
As !he  WC was extended, most of the government owned land was allotted to settlers from East 
Punjab.‘effectively eliminating the remaining grazing areas. In Gondalpur itself, as mentioned 
above, over half the land was acquired by absentee landlords during the decade or so before irriga- 
tion began.”  Much of the area acquired by absentees was prime land during the pre-canal period 
because it was relatively low, being located on the periphery of the inactive flood plain. This area 
was particularly valuable because well irrigation was possible, though just barely, since the water 
‘%his  section is based on data presented in Merrey(l983: Chap. VII-1x1. 
’%he  WC is one of the anvnymous cases in Bottrall(1981). 
158y the late 1930s a few villagers had re-acquired about half of this land, all from one landlord. Today about a quarter of 
Gondalpur‘s land is owned by non-residents. 
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the rains, facilitating the successful cultivation of crops based on rainfall. Ironically, within about 
25 years of the introduction of canal irrigation. most of this land became severely waterlogged, 
and somewhat saline. Today. although only a portion of this area is officially classified as water- 
logged, much of it is in fact not very productive. A major portion is still owned by absentee land- 
lords, and cultivated by very poor tenants who cannot make a living on this land. I  return to this 
below. 
A major consequence of the implementation of the WC was the complete loss of local control of 
water. On the other hand, compared to the pre-canal period, the quantity and predictability of 
water increased manyfold which enabled a shift from rainfed agriculture with some well irrigation 
to a largely irrigated regime. However, given the design of the system, with minimal latitude for 
manipulating water supplies except at the headwork (still  within very limited parameters), the 
supply of water to the local users depends on decisions made at the headworks by the Executive 
Engineer. His decisions are based primarily on instructions from Lahore and the available water 
supply in  the Jhelum River, and not on  conditions or demand for water in the command area. The 
system is a supply- rather than a demand-driven system; that is, whatever water is available is 
distributed according to fixed procedures. The objective of these procedures is to spread water as 
equitably as possible over as large an area as is possible regardless of crop water requirements or 
farmers' demand at any point in time. 
Very detailed data are available on cropping patterns since the beginning of canal irrigation in 
Gondalpur. While there have been adjustments in the relative importance of particular crops, and 
the addition of new crops such as rice and sugar cane in recent decades, the overall management 
strategy has not changed greatly. Gondalpur farmers, like most Punjab farmers, pursue a mixed 
cropping strategy, avoiding dependence on a single crop. During the summer (monsoon)  season, 
the major crops in  the early decades of canal irrigation were bajra (spiked millet), then a staple 
grain, but now primarily a fodder crop, cotton (a cash crop), and miscellaneous fodder crops. 
Today, paddy has become extremely important as a cash crop, as has sugar cane. During the win- 
ter season, wheat is the major crop (for cash in the past, primarily subsistence now). along with 
mustard, spinach, clover, and alfalfa (all used as fodder crops). 
Cultivators' first priority is fodder for their cattle, followed by wheat for their own subsistence, 
and finally a cash crop in order to buy necessities and pay taxes and fees. Farmers use rotations 
and manuring to maintain soil fertility, but in 1977  at least they used minimal amounts of com- 
mercial fertilizer. 
From the beginning, the intensity  of agriculture along the LJC and in Gondalpur has been 
greater than the design intensity. Whereas the system was designed on the assumption that only 
75% of the total command area would be irrigated in a year, from the beginning the actual sown 
area was around 96% and the harvested area was 85%. When supplementary water from the 
SCARP tubewells became available in 1965, the average cropping intensity for Gondalpur went to 
140%. However, it dropped to 120% by 1975-76  because of increased waterlogging again. 
Because the timing and quantity of water supplied is relatively fixed, and cannot be influenced 
by the cultivators, farmers attempt to match their cropping pattern to the water supply. Using rules 
of thumb, they plan the mix and area of their crops based on  what they think they can irrigate dur- 
ing the season. They tend to stretch water at peak times and often under-irrigate; during periods 
when the crops need less water than supplied, they over-irrigate in  an attempt to store extra water 
in  the root zone. Both over- and under-irrigation are considered to be among the major causes of 
the waterlogging and salinity problems faced by Pakistan today. To oversimplify, over-irrigation 
contributes t"  waterlogging by raising the water table;  under-irrigation contributes to salinization 
by leading to movement of salts upward in the soils through capillary action and evaporation, and 
by failure to leach salts downward below the root zone (Lowdermilk et al. 1978[11]:56). 
20 When the canal was opened in 1904. the Persian wheel wells wele immediately abandoned. 
This was generally true throughout the Punjab region, and has been reported as a key impact in 
19th century Uttar Pradesh as well (Whitcombe 1972).  In addition, the British and modern Pakis- 
tan governments as a maiter of policy incorporated all the inundation canals into the larger sys- 
tem. These former inundation canals are now operated on a non-perennial basis: they receive 
water during the summer (monsoon)  season when water in the system is plentiful. 
The whole area was thus made completely dependent on one massive canal which was oper- 
ated by engineers who resided over 200 kilometers from the tail of the system, and responded to 
commands from further up the system more than to demands and conditions communicated from 
below. The implementation of the WC is a clear case of centralization through linearization in 
which local control centers were by-passed as a higher level of the state took over control of the 
water supply. 
Environmental Stress: Responses to  Waterlogging and Salinity 
Since Independence, waterlogging and salinity have come to be recognized as the most danger- 
ous menace facing the irrigation system of Pakistan. However, the problem has a long history. 
Within a few years of its opening in the 19th century, the Western Jumna Canal in Uttar Pradesh 
was threatened by waterlogging and salinity. This became a major concern in the 20th century as 
canal irrigation expanded. In some areas, including the Chaj Doab itself, the problem was serious 
enough to threaten the viability of the canals. A Waterlogging Inquiry Committee began examining 
the problem in the mid-1920s. and the British experimented with various technical solutions. 
These included drainage, lining canals, restricting canal supplies and closing canals, and the first 
attempt at vertical drainage through tubewells on the WC itself. 
There is considerable controversy over the actual extent and modern trends of waterlogging and 
salinity. In  the late 1970s. some authorities claimed as much as 50% of the canal-irrigated area of 
the country had a water table of less than three meters and was thus waterlogged or potentially 
waterlogged, and as much as a third of the country’s irrigated land was “strongly saline or sodic” 
(Malik 1978; Lowdermilk et al. 1978[11]:56-63).” 
The causes of waterlogging and salinity are complex, involving both environmental factors and 
the design and operation of the canal system. A very flat terrain with low gradients combines with 
very heavy rains during the summer monsoons to create drainage problems that are difficult to 
solve. Design and operation factors include the absence of linings in main canals and the newer 
link canals, even in porous soils or where the canals are elevated above the ground, inadequate 
drainage facilities at all levels, and farmers’ irrigation practices (which are responses to the design 
and operation of the larger system). 
By the 1920s waterlogging had become a serious problem on the WC. In  the area around Gon- 
dalpur the water table rose by as much as 18  meters above the pre-canal depth, to within less 
than a meter of the surface in some areas. Gondalpur and a neighboring village had several 
hundred hectares of land thrown out of production from waterlogging. The Mona Drain, which 
began functioning in 1928, was expected to drain this area. The water table had stabilized before 
’%he  Punjab government estimates that seepage from the large link canals is causing the loss of 607 - 810 hectares per 
day to waterlogging -this would amount to 221,000 - 296,000 hectares per year. if correct (remarks by a senior official 
from the Government of Pakistan. 1985). the installation of the SCARP II tubewells in the mid-1960s. and operation of these tubewells is 
said to have lowered the water table in the area one to two meters where it has again allegedly 
stabilized. However, the quality of the water being pumped was declining by the late 1970s. and 
the whole SCARP program was facing severe Cost and management constraints (Johnson 1982). 
The Gondalpur records reflect the impact of waterlogging, and the solution was to close the 
canals as of the early 1920s. During the 1920s and 1930s. the area defined in the records as 
rainfed  (i.e.,  not receiving irrigation water) expanded slowly from about 3% of the total cultivated 
area in the first 5 years of irrigation to over 50% in the early 1330s. It dropped slowly thereafter to 
around 5% of the total cultivated area in the mid-1970s. It seems most likely that the high percen- 
tage of rainfed land in  the 1920s and 1930s was the result of waterlogging and canal closures. 
The official figures on waterlogged and saline land in Gondalpur during this period were approxi- 
mately 120 hectares or about a third of the total cultivable land in  Gondalpur. However, these fig- 
ures are suspect. Waterlogging was sufficiently serious that at least five land owning families 
were given new land in southern Punjab under a government scheme to compensate people 
whose land was put out of production by waterlogging and salinity. 
The records indicate that the impact of waterlogging and the conversion of land to rainfed by the 
government (by reducing and stopping canal water supplies) combined with the worldwide 
depression in the 1930s to drastically reduce the productivity and incomes of Gondalpur farmers. 
The total annual estimated wheat produced in  the village fell by 78%  between the 1909-1917 
average and the 1933-36 average. Whereas selling 33% of the wheat crop was sufficient to pay 
the annual irrigation and land revenue taxes in 1909-17. by the 1933-36 period these taxes were 
equivalent to 157% of the cash value of the wheat crop. 
The official response to the waterlogging crisis in the Gondalpur area in  the 1920s and 1930s 
illustrates several points. First, one of the consequences of over-centralization, especially in the 
absence of any effective communication upward in the system, is an inability to identify and 
respond to localized problems until they become crises. Thus, it was not until there was standing 
water on large tracts that had previously been cultivated that the government recognized the prob- 
lem. Part of the solution was to build a drain, a necessary but insufficient action by itself. Another 
part of the solution was to reduce or stop canal irrigation supplies to large areas, including areas 
that were not waterlogged, thus reducing the productivity of a very large area and the incomes of 
many people. 
This response is a clear case of the impact of hyperintegration. When a system is hyperinte- 
gated, disturbances or crises in one part of the system have negative impacts on other parts and 
that system becomes more vulnerable and unstable. In the case of Gondalpur, the system survived 
in  the short run, but at the expense of a large (but indeterminable with present data) number of 
cultivators who had become dependent on the WC.17 
The official figures give the impression that waterlogging and salinity in Gondalpur declined dur- 
ing the 1940s and 1950s. However, there is a wide gap between the official figures for water- 
logged and saline land and farmers‘ perceptions of the extent of these problems in  the village 
today, and I  am sure this discrepancy is not a new phenomenon. In  fact, this region was chosen as 
the second SCARP site and large capacity tubewells operated by the government were installed in 
the area,  including one on each of Gondalpur’s three watercourses in the mid-1960s. These 
tubewells have lowered the water table somewhat and enabled both the intensification of 
17Merrey (1 983) argues that eatramion of much of the surplus production from Small farmers in these early decades of 
canal irrigation had a fundamental and lasting impact on the +em’s  capacity to respond to development opportunities 
today. If that argument has any merit, British policies in dealing with waterlogging were a major wntributing factor. 
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ing to official figures, the area uncultivated due to waterlogging in Gondalpur has increased by a 
factor of three since the installation of the tubewells. Based on our household survey.18 and our 
observations as well as those of farmers, it is clear that waterlogging and salinity continue to have 
an important impact on the productivity of about 60% of the land in Gondalpur, far beyond what is 
recognized by the official figures, though further research would be needed to quantify the impact. 
The SCARP tubewells are designed to both lower the water table and provide supplementary 
irrigation. However, they are operated by government employees according to schedules made up 
in a central office. The schedules are developed by electrical engineers based on expected electric 
supply (which is short), and are not based on local irrigation or drainage needs. Thus, SCARP 
water is often not available when most needed (i.e., in the early weeks of the paddy crop before 
the monsoon starts) or comes when less water is needed, contributing to the over-irrigation 
blamed on farmers. 
This is a clear case of meddling. The SCARP system is a second imposed over-centralized sys- 
tem, and its operation is apparently not coordinated with the operation of the canal system even 
where the Irrigation Department controls both.19 By operating in  a way that ignores local 
demands, the SCARP tubewells exacerbate the waterlogging and salinity problems they are 
designed to solve,  inducing further instability in the larger system in the long run. This is shown 
by the reduction in cropping intensity in Gondalpur from 140%  to 120%  due to waterlogging. 
Conclusion 
During the British period, a number of large scale irrigation systems were constructed on the 
various interfluves of Punjab, each managed from a central point by officials responsive primarily 
to directives from above but having little capacity to respond to demands from below. The British 
began linking different interfluves into larger systems, a process that reached its culmination in 
the 1960s and 1970s with the completion of the major dams and link canals. These integrated a 
number of already large, but separate, systems into one huge system. In order to manage this new 
system and the construction tasks involved, WAPDA was created in 1958. Since then, WAPDA 
has expanded its role from construction to include operation of major dams and the national elect- 
ric grid, construction of the SCARP tubewell schemes and management of some of them, and 
research into water management and land reclamation at the farm level. 
During the 1970s. when the government became very concerned about alleged mismanage- 
ment of water by farmers at the watercourse level, a new organization, the On-Farm Water Man- 
agement Directorate (OFWM), was set up within the Agriculture Department to take the lead in 
inducing farmers to rehabilitate watercourses and do precision land leveling. New legislation was 
adopted in each province, ostensibly enabling the establishment of water users associations but in 
fact strengthening the power of the state over the watercourse. Farmers are now obliged to carry 
out maintenance themselves or repay the costs if the government does it for them (ORNM officials 
also have special roles in these associations). 
"Farmers reported that 93 hectares (27%  of the cultivated land in the village) were seriouslyaffected by waterlogging and 
salinity. The survey did not include land at one end of  the village. constituting 33% of the total cultivated area. which is 
owned by outsiders and Cultivated by very poor tenant. This land (about one-third of the village) floods periodically and has 
lost production recent years as the water table has crept upward. 
"It  is also a case of hyperintegration  of the electricity grid. in which local areas suffer as a result of constraints imposed 
elsewhere. Through its wntroi of the dams (water supply) and the whole electricity production and distribution system. 
WAPDA presents an interesting case for further research on centralization issues 
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integrate - hyperintegrate, if you will - institutions responsible for fertilizer supply, seed supply, 
extension, watercourse reconstruction, and the Irrigation Department itself. CWM Is presented 
ostensibly as a decentralization project which attempts to'develop a degree of self-management at 
a localized level (James Wolf, personal communication). There is provision for farmer participation 
in this program but, similar to the OFWM program, such participation is based on the legislation 
described above, which defines a long list of duties and sanctions which the government can 
impose on associations not carrying out required maintenance. Government officials delegated to 
project areas by the Provincial Government retain control of water and other resources and con- 
tinue to respond to directives from the provincial capital rather than to the demands of local 
farmers. All of these activities are directed at trying to impose state wishes at  the local level, but 
they do not address the fundamental organizational issues in Pakistan's irrigation management 
structure. 
With the financial and technical support of the major international donors, Pakistan is proceed- 
ing along a path in its irrigation development policies that began with the British colonial govern- 
ment. The processes of segregation (creation of additional institutions) and linearization (coopting 
lower order control institutions' functions by higher order control institutions) are leading to 
higher degrees of state control over irrigation water (i.e., centralization). But the system's prob- 
lems are not solved, and additional new problems are created by the technical solutions imple- 
mented by the State, as well as by the performance of the new institutions. These lead to further 
centralization, and to pathological tendencies such as meddling with lower order affairs and hyper- 
integration. The state response is further centralize, and the process is exacerbated by a positive 
feedback loop: the more centralized the system becomes, the less able it is to respond to local level 
problems until they become crises threatening the viability of the system. And the responses to 
such local crises often have negative impact on other components of the system since the auto- 
nomy of local subsystems has been destroyed. 
This paper does not prove a case but rather raises questions about the direction Pakistan is tak- 
ing in  developing its irrigation system. More is known about farmers' management strategies than 
about how the system works - how state institutions operate, relate to each other, and relate to 
farmers. This paper has applied an analytical framework to identify key questions and research 
issues. Much research is already underway in Pakistan with the support of USAID, World Bank. 
and others. But the focus is primarily on very technical issues and to a lesser extent on local 
organizational issues. However, the following questions are not being explored systematically: 
1. To what extent has the proliferation of agencies (segregation)  and concentration of control at 
high levels of the state (centralization) led to inappropriate intervention at local levels (meddling). 
inability to respond to local problems until they reach crisis proportions, vulnerability of the larger 
system to crises that get out of hand and reverberate throughout the system (hyperintegration), 
and a tendency for institutions created for particular systemic purposes (system-serving institu- 
tions) to become self-serving institutions?" 
2. What management changes are feasible, given the design of the present physical system, and 
would allow for a greater capacity to respond to local level demands and problems, including an 
enhanced capacity for local level institutions to take back from higher level institutions some 
degree of control over local affairs?  To what extent and at what level could the system be con- 
verted from a supply-driven system to a demand-driven system? 
~ 
"Flannery  (1  972:423) suggests that the evolutionary trend of institutions generally is from system-serving to self-serving. 
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management, greater responsiveness  to local demand. and greater autonomy for discrete subsys- 
tems, including an enhanced ability for local groups to take responsibility for local level manage- 
ment? For example, the watercourses are far larger than most authorities think can be managed 
effectively and directly by farmer groups (Uphoff et al. 1985).  Would replacing these watercourses 
with a larger number of small watercourses be feasible, and would this enable greater local capac- 
ity to organize and manage the irrigation system. 
4. What changes can be induced in the irrigation agencies themselves which would assist them 
to decentralize and become more responsive to local needs and problems while still maintaining 
an overall systemic perspective?  For example, could this be induced through a bureaucratic reo- 
rientation process which has been successful elsewhere (Korten and Uphoff 1981)) 
5. If some combination of specific action research activities were undertaken to explore the 
above questions, what difference could be made in the productivity and long term viability of the 
system and the well-being of the people dependent on the system? 
The paper began with a quotation from Bennett (1976)  which notes the instability and uncer- 
tainty, rather than stability and greater control, that results from the growth of large-scale socio- 
natural systems. A better understanding of Pakistan's irrigation system from a systematic socio- 
centric perspective would test the validity of Bennett's observation, and could lead to strategies for 
achieving the potential productivity of the lndus Food Machine. REORGANIZING IRRIGATION: LOCAL LEVEL MANAGEMENT 
IN THE PUNJAB (PAKISTAN) 
Douglas J.  Merrey' 
Discussions of the problems facing irrigated agriculture in Pakistan usually begin with an irony: 
despite the favorable climate, fertile land, hard working farmers, and possession of the largest 
integrated irrigation system in the world, agricultural production is very low. It is low by any 
standard in relation to similar situations in  other countries, to the potential demonstrated year 
after year on demonstration plots and - even more so - to the needs of Pakistan's rapidly growing 
population. 
Before World War  11,  the area which is now Pakistani Punjab was a major exporter of wheat. By 
Independence in 1947 exports had ended. Output per capita continued to decline until the mid- 
1960s. By the early 1970s. with the adoption of high yielding varieties of wheat, per capita pro- 
ductivity had returned to the levels of the late 1940s. but during the 1970s it stagnated. In most 
years up to 1978 Pakistan had to import about one quarter of  its wheat requirements. Although 
the figures have improved significantly since 1978, mainly as the result of the introduction of 
improved rust resistant varieties, yield per hectare remains low. 
Although the irrigation system had originally been built in order to transform drylands into 
highly productive farmland, the productivity of large areas has been either destroyed or signifi- 
cantly reduced by salinity and a rising water table. A considerable proportion of the population 
now lives under the threat of this type of desertification. Some surveys show that more than half 
the approximately 13.5 million hectares of irrigated land in the lndus Basin are affected by varying 
degrees of waterlogging and salinity (Clyma et al. 1975a; Malik 1978).  The situation is regarded so 
seriously that newspapers carry learned and often passionate articles by experts and frequent edi- 
torials urging more action. 
There is considerable controversy concerning the seriousness of waterlogging and salinity in 
Pakistan, and whether the situation is deteriorating or  improving. Two factors are responsible for 
the controversy: first, the relevant information is inadequate, inconsistent, and subject to different 
interpretations; second, because s.uch large funds are involved in  the various programs for control- 
ling the problems, the whole question has become a political issue. 
The process of deterioration is generally blamed on the twin menace of salinity and waterlog- 
ging. In order to reverse it, several programs have been launched to reclaim waterlogged and 
saline land by means of drains and high capacity tubewells to lower the water table (referred to as 
the Salinity Control and Reclamation Program or SCARP), and to flush salts out of the soil. Until 
recently, all the irrigation projects in Pakistan emphasized large-scale capital-intensive construc- 
tion: SCARP tubewells, link canals, and dams - culminating in the Tarbela Dam Project on the 
Upper lndus River. This dam is billed as the largest earth-filled dam in the world. It is financed by 
huge foreign loans and is designed for both irrigation water control and the generation of electric- 
ity. It is important to note that these projects were ba.sed on research that was in  turn based on 
certain assumptions about local level water management. The loss of water in watercourses 
before it reached the crops was assumed to be minimal, and due mostly to evapotranspiration. It 
was not thought to be adding to the water table. In particular, it was assumed that most of the 
water delivered to tertiary irrigation ditches (watercourses) reaches the root zones of the crops. 
'Social Scientist. International Irrigation Management Institute. Digana Village via Kandy. Sri Lanka In the early 1970s research teams from Colorado State University, in cooperation with Pakistani 
organizations, especially the Mona Reclamation Experimental Research Project (supported by 
funding from the United States Agency for International Development), began to explore the pos- 
sibility that a major cause of the twin menace should be sought at  the farm level. 
They started by measuring watercourse and field application efficiencies. These studies demon- 
strated a wide variety in the delivery efficiencies of watercourses, but on the whole they were 
shown to be substantially lower than had previously been assumed. Overall, delivery efficiencies 
of watercourses seem to be less than 60% - often substantially less; that is, 60% or less of the 
water entering the watercourses reaches the fields. Unlevelled land, fragmented plots, and lack of 
knowledge about plant-soil-water relations reduce the efficiency of water use even further. Early 
studies in a SCARP area demonstrated that wastage of water in these areas is especially high, 
SCARP tubewells pump the ground water into watercourses where it mixes with canal water, 
increasing the available irrigation water, while lowering the water table. However, because of 
poor watercourse construction and maintenance, most of the water returns to the groundwater, 
minimizing the effectiveness of the SCARP program in reducing waterlogging. Overall, Pakistan’s 
irrigation system is estimated to be operating at less than 30% efficiency; that is, less than 30% of 
the water diverted from the rivers is stored in root zones for crop use.’ 
These findings led to the development of pilot projects designed to improve the efficiency of 
water delivery and usage in order both to increase agricultural productivity and to reduce water- 
logging and salinity. A key component of these projects was an attempt to induce local water 
users to cooperate in reconstructing and maintaining their joint watercourses. This component 
has also proved to be a major obstacle: it is quite difficult, though not impossible, to organize 
farmers to co-operate on a short term improvement project, but it is even more difficult to induce 
them to continue cooperating for maintenance and management of the watercourse on a longer 
term basis. This paper presents a case study of a reconstruction project on one watercourse and 
identifies the impediments preventing its successful completion. It also summarizes the results of 
a larger survey of organizational problems on improved watercourses. The basic argument is that 
a major source of the severe technical problems of Pakistan’s irrigation system is ineffective 
organization of management especially at the local level; and attempts to improve the system so 
far have been hindered by the failure to recognize this social dimension of the problem. 
The “lndus  Food Machine”:  History and Development Plans 
The history of the development of Pakistan’s irrigation system is not long, but it is complex. The 
best recent account is  that of Michel (1967), which draws on older histories of irrigation in Punjab 
plus British and Pakistani administrative and technical documenis. and post-Independence 
research. Only a brief summary is possible here. 
Environment. The lndus plain is a vast piedmont alluvial plain; the lndus River system has a 
mean annual flow of 175,156 million cubic meters in Pakistan, twice the mean annual water pro- 
duction of the Nile River (Johnson et al. 1977).  The climate is predominantly arid and semi-arid: in 
the northern regions annual evaporation averages about 152 centimeters (cm) while in the south 
it is about 190  cm;  annual precipitation ranges from 50 cm in the north to 7.5 cm in the south. The 
combination of low and unpredictable rainfall and sub-tropical arid to semi-arid climate makes 
irrigation a necessity for successful agriculture. Because the major portion of the modern system. 
as well as the research reported here, are centered on what is now the Province of Punjab in Pak- 
istan, the remainder of this paper focuses of this area. 
2The findings of the Colorado State University research are reported in Corey and Clyrna (1975); Clyrna et 81.  (1975a and 
b): Reuss and Kernper (1978);  Johnson et al. (1  977); Eckert el  81.  (1975); and others. 
27. The Punjab plains are crossed by six rivers, the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas. 
Since the implementation of the lndus Waters Treaty of  1960 between India and Pakistan, Pakis- 
tani Punjab has been utilizing the waters of the western rivers -the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab; 
the bulk of the others rivers' water is utilized by India. The rivers are silt-laden and, because of the 
deposition of heavy silt particles, the beds are usually higher than the flood plains. The flood plains 
were (and still are) subject to flooding during the summer monsoon. The land between the rivers 
includes areas in the central portions that are above the flood plains. These high areas are called 
bar. Before the modern irrigation system these bar were covered by grassy and woody vegetation. 
They were exploited by semi-nomadic people with large herds of camels, sheep, goats, and cattle. 
These people also engaged in some rainfall agriculture, and cultivated small parcels of land irri- 
gated by Persian wheel wells, an endless chain of pots worked by a gear and shaft mechanism 
and powered by yoked animals. These wells were often 15  - 30 meters deep. 
Development of the System. The British began planning canal projects even before the annexa- 
tion of  Punjab in 1849. The first modern canal in  Punjab, the Upper Bari Doab Canal, was opened 
in 1859 and irrigation commenced in 1861. Thereafter the British continued building increasingly 
sophisticated and large-scale canals, with stock-taking interludes between them, until the end of 
their rule. Since 1947, Pakistan, with the aid of international donors, has completely remodeled 
and expanded the system. Aside from several new canal projects, two huge dams (Mangala and 
Tarbela) have been completed, and link canals constructed to carry water from the western to the 
eastern rivers and canals to replace water retained by India. According to the official figures, there 
are some 62,790 kilometers of canals in  Pakistan; and there are 88,000 watercourses, irrigation 
ditches that carry the water to the farmers' own lateral ditches and to their fields. These average 
over three kilometers in length. Of 14  million hectares of cultivable land with access to river 
water for irrigation, about 10  million hectares are irrigated and cultivated every year. It is no sur- 
prise that the system has been referred to as the "lndus Food Machine"  (ibid.;  Planning Commis- 
sion 1978:3). 
The British engineers who built the system had no previous experience in building irrigation 
works. When they began, they had little theoretical knowledge of hydraulics, and knew little about 
groundwater hydrology and the like (Michel 1967:50-51).  Furthermore, modern construction tech- 
nology - machinery and building materials - was not available at first. By trial and error and exper- 
iments they developed many of the basic formulas and techniques now used throughout the 
world. 
The system uses barrages to divert water from the rivers into the canals. The canals are 
designed for continuous operation at or near full capacity, some year-round (perennial canals), 
some for only the summer season (non-perennial).  They are designedto maintain a "stable 
regime;" that is, silting and scouring ultimately balance in the main canals (Michel 196751  ). But 
the amount of flow cannot be regulated on demand and it may sometimes be interrupted during 
floods or repair work. Water flows continuously from canals into distributaries, through concrete 
modular outlets (mogha) into watercourses (which  often have several branches). and finally into 
farmers' laterals and onto the fields (Fig. 1).  The mogha is designed to deliver a fixed quantity of 
water when the canal is flowing at full capacity. Each watercourse commands from 60 - 250 hec- 
tares of land, generally cultivated by from 10  to over 150  farmers. The Irrigation Department is 
directly responsible for the operation and maintenance of the barrages, canals and distributaries, 
to the mogha. It also lays out the route and commanded area of the watercourse, but its operation 
and maintenance are the joint responsibility of the farmers cultivating land in  its commanded 
area. Individual farmers (or small groups) build and maintain small ditches (laterals) to carry water 
from the watercourse to their own fields. 
- 28 - Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of canal system 
Each farmer has a right to water proportional to the size of his land holding. Water is distributed 
on a time basis: each farmer is alloted a period of time to take water, usually on a weekly rotarion 
basis. Originally the watercourse rotations (warabandil were devised by mutual agreement among 
the shareholders. Shareholders who cannot agree on a rotation system may apply to the Irrigation 
Department to'establish a fixed legal system; most watercourses have now been converted to this 
pakka warabandi. Because it is a continuous flow system farmers receive the same share every 
week regardless of needs - which leads to periodic over- and under-irrigation. Trading of water 
among farmers is illegal because it causes waste, but it is commonly practiced. 
The system was originally designed to operate with a minimum of human regulation or interfer- 
ence. For example, water is regulated at the head of the canal, but it is not possible to vary the 
flow into watercourses. Aside from engineering considerations, undoubtedly the British knew that 
recruitment of competent and responsible people would be difficult and a flexible system of water 
distribution would lead to uncontrollable abuses. They were also concerned to keep operational 
costs at a minimum since they were interested in recovering their investment quickly. These con- 
siderations also underlay the policy of minimal local intervention: farmers were expected to build 
and maintain their watercourses and settle disputes among themselves. The Irrigation Department 
retains considerable residual power, set out in  the Canal and Drainage Act of 1873  (Jahania 
1973). This power is used only when the shareholders appeal to the Irrigation Department. Sim- 
ilarly, the extension of irrigation included no instructions to the farmers on irrigation techniques. 
Farmers were left to their own devices (Johnson et al. 1977:1257). The major method continues to 
consist of the flooding of  small basins. There is no adequate means of communicating information 
from the users to the higher level managers, or even from the top-down. Finally. no efforts have 
been made to organize farmers locally on either a formal or informal basis to manage the water- 
course. The watercourse is a collective or "public good" which benefits all farmers using it, but 
- 29 - there is no mechanism to insure that each contributes his share to its maintenance (Olson 1965; 
Lowdermilk et al. 1978 [ll]:119-29). 
The British had several motives for building the canal system. In the beginning there was an 
idealistic and enthusiastic desire to extend irrigation to demonstrate the benefits of European 
science. A decisive motive for the first canal was to give employment to potentially disruptive Sikh 
army veterans. Another more important and lasting motive was to improve the agricultural value 
and thus the revenue-producing capacity of the newly annexed lands. Yet another motive was fear 
of famine (Michel 1967:65-66). 
The earlier canals were mostly designed to improve agriculture in  already settled areas. Later 
projecis emphasized settling new waste lands, which involved not only canal building but laying 
out of  new villages, cities, roads, railroads, etc., and distribution of land to settlers. The British 
hoped to reduce famine in India by making Punjab the “granary of India” and to relieve overpopu- 
lation in the eastern districts of Punjab by settling farmers from these areas on new lands. 
Characteristics of Modern lndus Basin  Development Plans. Michel (ibid.) provides a detailed 
account of all the programs that have been proposed to solve the problems of the lndus Basin irri- 
gation system, and the results of their implementation up to the mid-1960s. In this section I  do not 
discuss these programs per se but focus on certain common characteristics of the proposals and 
policies. Since the Independence of Pakistan and especially since the signing of the lndus Waters 
Treaty in 1960  with India, a series of distinguished panels and study groups have produced long 
and detailed reports on the problems of the lndus Basin and their solutions. Perhaps the most 
influential reports have been the so-called “Revelle Report” (White House 1964)  and the World 
Bank report (Lieftinck et al. 1969). A more recent panel, of which Revelle was a member, has 
reviewed the Revelle Report‘s recommendations and progress (or lack thereof) so far, and offered 
a series of research guidelines and topics (Planning Commission 1978). 
While these panels have suggested a wide variety of solutions to the problems of  Pakistan’s irri- 
gation system, all of their recommendations share several basic characteristics. The first is that 
they all have emphasized engineering and technological programs: large-scale tubewell projects, 
dams and link canals, and the like. The White House (1964) report recommended a massive inte- 
grated extension program to get farmers to adopt modern technology, but this program never 
materialized. The second characteristic is that all of the advice offered has required massive capi- 
tal outlays, mostly of foreign origin. Michel discusses Pakistani criticism of the SCARP tubewell 
programs made on this basis in the early 1960s - criticism that was not heeded and that Michel 
himself dismisses (1  967:470-72). The thirdcharacteristic is that the implementation of the pro- 
posed projects requires continuous input from foreign experts; that is, foreign consultants 
financed by major donors to Pakistan have advised Pakistan to adopt highly capital - and foreign- 
expert - intensive solutions, many of which have been and are being implemented. Michel dis- 
cusses this point and defends the use of foreign consultants, but his arguments are not entirely 
convincing (ibid.:357-64). 
The final major characteristic of the advice given in the Revelle and World Bank reports con- 
cerns the administration and organization of the system. Neither panel included any kind of social 
scientist other than economists. No research data on organization were available, but there is no 
indication in  the reports that this was perceived as a handicap. Both reports were written after the 
Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) had been set up to execute the large scale 
water, power, and reclamation projects envisioned by Pakistan’s planners; in fact, Michel suggests 
that one motivation for establishing WAPDA may have been to attract foreign aid (ibid.:350).  The 
few pages devoted to advice on organizational matters (White House 1964:179-84; Lieftinck et al. 
1969 [11]:186-91) suggest further centralization of planning and management at the highest levels, 
and better co-ordination of the various organizations involved. No serious consideration seems to 
have been given - either by the foreign advisors or by the Pakistani planners and administrators - 
- 30. to the problem of the relationship between the users of the irrigation water and the managers of 
the system; all assumed that the problems and their solutions were ones the planners understood 
best and could impose from above. One short paragraph in the Revelle Report, entitled "Long 
Range Goals,"does  suggest that "a central hope for the future should be the gradual emergence 
of associations forfarmers  ...."  (White House 1964:184), but this obviously was for the future, after 
the system had developed; it was not recommended as a strategy for developing the system. 
More recently, for the first time in Pakistan's history, research has begun to focus on local level 
water management, This research has identified local level waste and mismanagement of irriga- 
tion water as a key constraint on improving agricultural production as well as a cause of waterlog- 
ging and salinity. Research on a similar irrigation system in India suggests that certain character- 
istics of the administration of the system itself result in farmers' uncertainty about their water 
supply, and this is a major constraint on productivity (Reidinger 1974; Gustafson and Reidinger 
1971). All of this research has resulted in a recognition of the importance of  local organizational 
factors, and recommendations for forming local farmer organizations (Water Management 
Research Project 1976  Planning Commission 1978). 
Many of these recommendations, however, retain the "engineering mentality" of earlier advi- 
sors; that is, farmer participation and organization are viewed as being of the same order as tech- 
nological problems: the function of research is to discover the appropriate organization of design - 
"the solution"  - and introduce it. Just as the problems of rising water-tables, salinization, and 
inadequate supply of irrigation water are "solved"  by installation a network of tubewells, so,  it 
seems to be assumed, inadequate organization can be solved by installing a new farmer organiza- 
tion. Furthermore, only the formation of local organizations with vaguely defined but limited 
responsibilities have been suggested. There has been no consideration of the dynamics, the ade- 
quacy, or the consequences of the present organization of the irrigation system. 
Most of the high-powered recommendations and the policies pursued to date, then, share the 
same characteristics: an orientation toward purely technical solutions, designed and implemented 
from the top down, with the financial and advisory aid of foreign organizations, and an assumption 
that the experts know best what the problems are and how to solve them. Although the major 
reports and recommendations are thick and comprehensive, none have seriously addressed the 
most fundamental problem of all for the future of the lndus irrigation system: how should it be 
organized?  What should be the role of its users in its management?  What have been the conse- 
quences of the present organizational structure? Policy based on faulty assumptions about the 
goals, values, ability to co-operate, and behaviors of local users is bound to fail. For example, if 
local irrigation associations were established in  Pakistan and the legal framework for these organ- 
izations were to specify Western rules and procedures, such as decision-making by majority vote 
and some version of Robert's Rules of Procedure, these organizations would probably not work in 
the way envisioned by the planners. Such procedures are inconsistent with local users' decision- 
making patterns as well as with the prevailing stratifled socio-economic structure of rural society. 
The remainder of this chapter illustrates the potential of an  approach from social science towards 
the problems of designing and evaluating programs to involve the farmers in local irrigation 
improvement projects. 
Watercourse Reconstruction: A Case Study 
Gondalpur (a pseudonym) is a village in central Punjab, on the Chaj Doab, the area between the 
Jhelum and Chenab Rivers. This area has traditionally been called Gondalbar, because historically 
the Gondal tribe dominated the area. In the flood plains among the rivers, intensive agriculture 
based on flooding by the river, inundation canals, and wells, has been practiced for centuries. 
Being located above the flood plain, Gondalpur had no canal or inundation irrigation before 1904. 
The vegetation of this semi-arid area consisted of various small and deep-rooted trees which 
-31  - provided fuel, fruit, and fodder, and a variety of grasses on which the ancestors of the present 
inhabitants raised large herds of cattle. At  the time of the first British survey in 1857. there was 
one Persian wheel well irrigating 7 hectares;  irrigation was also practiced during the monsoon by 
catching runoff in a low place, and planting primarily millets, By the 1880%  30 years after British 
rule  was established in  the area, there were 3 Persian wheel wells. The wells tapped a water table 
15 - 25  meters deep, so that even with good oxen or buffaloes, only about one-fifth of a hectare 
could be irrigated in a 12 hour turn. 
Informants claim that animals, not land, were wealth: a man's standing in his community 
depended mainly on the size and quality of his herd. Agriculture was meant to supplement a diet 
which was based on dairy products and meat. The British land records show that the short-lived 
previous regime of Ranjit Singh had imposed a head tax on animals and no tax on land in this vil- 
lage. The British discontinued this policy and imposed a moderate (in their eyes) land revenue. 
This meant that land had to  be registered in individuals' names - an innovation. Informants say 
that their ancestors regarded this as an unfair burden and some sold or gave their land rights to 
others for almost nothing. Stories are told of how people in nearby villages punished their ene- 
mies and servants by having land registered in their names. 
During  the 49 years between the first British land settlement and the arrival of the canal water 
in Gondalpur. however, there was a substantial rise in population and a gradual extension and 
intensification of agriculture (Table 1). Population grew far more rapidly than did the extent of cul- 
tivable land, mostly as a result of immigration. There was also a fairly large-scale transfer of con- 
trol over land to outsiders - and a concomitant increase in  tenancy. The Lower Jhelum Canal was 
officially opened in 1901, but its water did not reach Gondalpur until the 1904-05 winter /rabbi) 
growing season. Its impact was immediate: scores of hectares of land came under cultivation dur- 
ing both the summer (kharif) and winter growing seasons. Former cattle keepers and part-time 
farmers became full-time farmers, either on their own land or as tenants on others' land. The area 
available for grazing animals declined while the number of animals increased, so that even a few 
years before the canal was introduced most farmers had begun devoting a substantial percentage 
of their land to growing fodder for their animals. Other changes since the introduction of canal 
Table f.  Changes in population  and cultivated area in Gondalpur since 1857. 
Year  Population  Areas of  C~OPS  harvested to hectares 
Rainfed  Irrigated  Total 
Well  Canal 
1857  67  18.8  7.3  0  26.1 
1890-91  310  87.1  17.2  0  104.3 
1901-02  568  69.3  18.2  0  87.5 
1905-06  na  4.5  0  194.4  198.8 
1910-1  1  565  0  0  233.7  233.7 
1921  767  2.0  0  315.1  317.1 
1931  758  133.4  0  139.7  273.4 
1951  914  40.5  0  242.6  283.1 
1961  1117  25.9  0  313.9  339.8 
1972a/  1246  36.5  0  384.3  420.8 
1977b/  1450  21.4  5.2  356.2  382.8 
Sources: All data are from unpublished village records except the 1961, 1972, and 
1977 population figures. The 1961 and 1972 population figures are from the Dis- 
trict Census Handbooks for those years; the 1977 population is based on a census 
carried out by the author and his wife in February-March 1977. "Na" means "not 
available." a/ The figures for area harvested are 1968-69 figures, the closest ones 
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irrigation.include: a further rise in population; increasing fragmentation of land holdings;,major 
changes in  diet; increasingly intensive agriculture; and a rise in  the water table of 12 to'20 
meters, so that today nearly everywhere it is less than 6 meters below the surface, and in some it 
is less than a meter and a half. A large low-lying tract in Gondalpur has become waterlogged and 
an adjacent previously productive area is now saline and unproductive. The major crops today are 
wheat and fodder crops in the winter, and rice, sugar cane, fodder crops, and some melons and 
cotton in the summer. Most of the land is double-cropped every year.3 
Watercourse Social Organization'.  The dominant landowners in Gondalpur, the Gondals. are 
divided into four named biradari, brotherhoods which are local co-resident groups based on a 
combination of patrilineal descent and marriage (Alvi 1972).  The biradari are concentrated on dif- 
ferent watercourse branches (Fig. 2). 
Key 
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limit  Of  commanded  -___-. 
Note  This  shows  the 
opproxmmte  route of  the 
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Fig. 2. Sketch map of  Gondalpur watercourse branches. 
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Ihrqh Chok  481 
made  during  1,  reCmdIr"Cll0"  project 
3The changes in Gondalpur between 1857 and 1977. both those that preceded and those that followed the introduction of 
canal irrigation. are the subjet of D. Merrey (1983). 
'Much  of the material on the watercourse reconstruction prolect and implications of  the concept of mat  appear in Merray 
(1  979) 
* 
- 33 Table 2 shows the relationship between biradari ana watercourse branch. The Gondal biradaris 
are Khirarane (branch B),  Muradke (branch C),  and Khudaya and Miane (branch D).  The first three 
so dominate particular branches that they are known by their names. Besides the Gondals, fami- 
lies belonging to other groups or zaL6 also have land on various branches. A few  Awan have very 
small holdings on branches B and C;  two Bhattis have some land on branch 6, as do three Sayid 
families; and some Muradke and Khudaya have land on branch 6,  though most of this land is 
either waterlogged or saline, or too high for irrigating. On branch D,  aside from the Khudaya, a 
few Pindi farmers also have land, as do the religious leaders of Gondalpur, the Miane. The num- 
bard#  and his family, who have relatively large holdings (20  - 30 hectares) are Khudaya; the 
Miane holdings are also.relatively large (about 10 hectares for each of three households), while 
the other two Gondal biradaris are mostly small farmers (2 - 8 hectares). Ehattis  outnumber Gon- 
dals in  the village as a whole as do the Massali laborers, but the former are mostly tenants and 
the latter landless and poor. 
Table 2. Biradaris involved in watercourse reconstruction?’ 
Number of  Watercourse”  Position on 
Households  People  branch  branch 
Gonddpur biradwii: 
Gondal-  Khudaya  11  70  D;  a little on B  H.  M. T 
Gondal-Khizarane  212  105  B  H.  M. T 
Gondal-  Muradke  7  43  C:  a little on B  H.M.T 
Gondal-Miane  5  36  D;  a linle on A  M.  T 
Langah  5  36  A  M 
Awan  11  47  B and Cc/  M 
18  78  B (2 households)  M  d/  Bhatti-Rajeane 
Sayid  3  25  B  H.  M 
non-Gondalpur biradaris: 
Kharal (Chak Air)  3  ?  A;  a little on B  H 
3 Pindi biradarise/  under 10  ?  AED  Ton both 
N tes  Branches: A - Chak Azir, B - Khizarane. C - Muradke. and D - Khudaya H - Head, M - Middle, T - Tail, 
a?  .  This  is not a complete list of a11  biradaris in Gondalpur; only those  having land irrigat d by the recon- 
St  ucted watercourse ar  listed. Values are based on  1977 complete household census.’/See  Figure 2. 
”Very  small holdings. ‘Only  two households of this biradari have land on this watercourse. There are 7 
Bhatti biradaris in Gondalpur with a total of 90  households and 416 people as of 1977. e/These  biradaris 
did not play an important role in the improvement project - their major holdings are on other watercourses; 
they generally acted together on this project. 
5Zar is a cognate of the word usually translated as “caste”  or “sub-caste”  in North India, but caste is not a proper transla- 
tion of zat here since 1.115  as understood in Gondalpur are not endogamous or systematically ranked vis-a-vis each other. 
For a complete discussion of ceste in Gondalpur (and Pakistan Punjab) see K. Merrey (1983). 
‘Numbardar  is a hereditary position created by the British: he CoIIecD the land revenue and irrigation fees for the govern 
ment. keeping a percentage for himself, and acts as an intermediary between the villageis and government officials. 
- 34 - At the head of branch A,  where it passes through Chak Aziz, are four related households of 
Kharal zat. One is a very large landowner (about 122 hectares), having bought much land in a 
nearby village. His brother has about 20 hectares on branch A and their half-brother's two sons 
have about 20 hectares between them. Though these two brothers often quarrel with each other, 
they did not during the watercourse project. I  shall refer to them collectively as the "step- 
nephews." Following the Kharal, on Gondalpur land, branch A irrigates the land of several very 
small farmers (0.5 - 9 hectares) of Langah zat. The members of this zat,  though poor, have mar- 
riage relations with the Khuydaya, Muradke. Kharal, and a~large  Pindi landlord. Some of the land 
belonging to the Miane is irrigated after the Langahs by branch A,  and finally, at the tail, branch A 
irrigates small portions of the relatively large holdings of several Pindi families. 
Watercourse Conditions Before Reconstruction. At the time of the study (1  976-77). the level of 
maintenance of all the branches on the watercourse was extremely poor. A SCARP tubewell had 
been installed at the head of the watercourse in  the mid-1960s. doubling the amount of water 
flowing through it. As is generally the case in the SCARP areas, the intensity of cultivation 
increased  substantially as a result of the increased water supply. Most land is now double-cropped 
each year on this watercourse. However, the capacity of the watercourse was not increased. 
Furthermore, for some years after the installation of the tubewell, there was no perceived  shor- 
tage of water. According to informants this led to a decrease in maintenance efforts, atrophying 
the already weak sanctions enforcing participation in  watercourse cleaning. Further, fragmenta- 
tion of plots has led to increased numbers of illegal (that is. not sanctioned by the Irrigation 
Department) cuts in the main water channels. The watercourse on all branches was choked with 
grass, bushes, and trees; leaked through rat holes, thin banks, and at junctions; and water 
remained standing in  many low sections after irrigation. On branch A,  since the Chak Aziz land is 
relatively high, the Kharal owners actively sabotaged efforts to cleanthe head of the watercourse. 
Silting raised the water level, and thus their ability to irrigate their high land, but it blocked a large 
percentage of the water from reachingthe middle and tail farmers. 
The Reconstruction Process. The lack of watercourse maintenance, combined with increasing 
pressure to raise production (in  part limited by the water supply), had created considerable dissa- 
tisfaction with the condition of the watercourse by 1976. In response to this dissatisfaction, I  was 
instrumental in arranging for the Mona Reclamation Experimental Project to choose this water- 
course for an experimental improvement program.'  In  this program, the Government supplies 
technical advice, supervision, and materials such as concrete outlets (nakka). The farmers are 
responsible for supplying all labor for the earthen improvements, masons for installing outlets, 
concrete sections, and culverts, and for subsequent maintenance. Some Gondalpur farmers had 
heard about the success of the improvement program in other villages: according to a survey they 
were aware that the losses from their watercourse were high and they were eager to improve it. 
The improvement program on this watercourse undoubtedly faced more problems than is usual 
on a single watercourse, but this makes it an important case to study as all of the problems 
encountered characterize other watercourse reconstruction efforts to various degrees. A descrip- 
tion of all that happened during the six months of active improvement work would constitute a 
book in itself; a brief summary will show the kinds of problems faced by the project. 
At a farmer meeting in June 1977. two committees were set up: one, for branch A,  included a 
Kharal representative from Chak Aziz (the youngest of the two step-nephews), a Gondalpur Lan- 
gah, and Pindi numbardar. For the main branch and branches B,  C,  and D. one Khudaya, one 
'The  arrangement was that I  would observe, but not participate in. the process; in fact. people often sought my interven- 
tion to  influence the engineers and upon occasion I  did offer suggestions to the Mona Project personnel - which were 
rarely followed. Khizarane. and an Awan were chosen. The branch C Muradke refused to take part in the 
improvement program on their branch and therefore had no committee member. There were sev- 
eral reasons for their refusal: they did not perceive much of a water shortage; they preferred to 
continue cutting their watercourse freely; and, because they were angry at their Awan relatives 
over unrelated issues, they opposed any program the Awan supported. 
Work began on branch A - but on the same day as an announcement of  land allotments under' 
the land consolidation program in Gondalpur; therefore, only Chak Aziz shareholders were present 
at the work site and they successfully pressured the Government engineer to start work on a new 
route for the watercourse that was parallel to the distributary around their village (see inset on 
Fig. 2). This route had been discussed previously and opposed by the middle shareholders, but 
now it became a fait accompli and they could not oppose it. Because the old route had passed 
through the step-nephews' land and another Kharal's courtyard, while the new one is on 
Government land and higher than the old one, the Kharal benefited substantially from this 
change. 
Over the next few months work continued fitfully on branch A,  and the engineer had branch D 
and B work begun even though he had not yet done a survey to indicate the route, width, and 
depth. The farmers on B and D noticed that their water supply was reduced as a result, leading to 
considerable tension between them and the engineer. At the meeting with the farmers, the engi- 
neer accused the farmers of not co-operating with him and gave them an ultimatum -to  follow his 
instructions without argument or he would abandon the project. The farmers were angry bdt 
agreed to his demands. These branches were then surveyed and the work redone.' 
A number of disputes broke out among the farmers (aside from a series of continuing disputes 
between the farmers and government officials): 
1.  On branch D,  two Khudaya, the numbardar (supported by the Miane), whose lands were at 
the head and middle, and his paternal cousin, a watercourse committee member most of 
whose land is at the tail, disputed over how far towards the tail the improvement work 
should go. The numbardar and Miane wanted the work to stop about 300  meters short of the 
cousin's land, so that no improvement work would be done on the section through their land. 
When the tail cousin refused to cooperate unless his demands were met the numbardar 
agreed, though the Miane continued to protest and refused to cooperate on the work. 
The Miane, near the middle and tail of D,  continued to dispute with Khudaya over how far the 
improvement should go and over the route of the watercourse. The engineer, based on his 
survey, wished to straighten it. Because it skirted the edge of Mianes' land and over the 
years had shifted, increasing their land, moving it would have reduced their land slightly. It 
was straightened, finally, but over their continuing protest. 
On branch B,  the Khizarane leader frequently argued with Muradke, Khudaya, and Sayid 
shareholders over the division of the work. 
2. 
3. 
'There  were significant differences among the branches in the organization and efficiency of  the work. Except for a few 
portions of branch D done collectively. the work on each portion of  all the branches were divided among the shareholders 
proportionally  to the amount of land they irrigated. The large farmers at the head and tail of branch A had their tenants and 
servants do the work, while the small farmers in the middle did their own share - and did it more quickly. Most of branch D 
was doen by tenants, servants, and hired laborers, and more time was spent smoking and gossiping than working, signifi- 
cantly slowing the work. All but a few of  the branch B shareholders did their own work, and theirs was completed very 
quickly. 




On branch A, the Pindi shareholders and Miane were lax about doing their share of the work, 
leading to conflict with the others and long delays in completing the section. 
The Langah committee member and the Kharal member disputed over the route changes in 
branch A demanded by the Kharal, as well as the division of work shares. Because of  his 
weak position, the Langah pursued these issues more with the engineer than with the 
Kharal directly. In every case, the Kharal won because both the government officials and 
other farmers feared the consequences of the Kharal not cooperating given their strategic 
position on the watercourse, 
The Kharal step-nephews, who had traditionally taken unauthorized wateF from the main 
branch, successfully sabotaged  the work on that branch, including preventing the removal of 
trees and straightening the route. There seemed to be three reasons for their obstructionism: 
they realized that taking illegal water from the main branch would be more difficult; they 
would lose a little of the land they had occupied if the watercourse were straightened; and 
they were jealous. They opposed any program that would benefit the weaker Gondalpur peo- 
ple, perhaps fearing they would become independent. 
The Kharal demanded and, by threatening to sabotage the project, obtained extra nakkas and 
double-sized culverts for their land but even after getting them the two step-nephews in par- 
ticular continued to sabotage the work. 
A project that was expected to be completed in less than two months was not finished in 
December 1977. the sixth month, when I  left. When I returned in May 1978, I  discovered that 
some sections still had not been reconstructed, especially in the middle and tail sections of A and 
B; some of the sanctioned nakkas had not been installed and several of the installed ones had 
been damaged; and no cleaning or maintenance had been done. All the branches were choked 
with weeds and silt and leaked from new unauthorized cuts in rebuilt banks. Even in October 
1978, the normal watercourse cleaning in preparation for the winter season had only been hapha- 
zardly done. 
The sections completed up to December 1977, immediately after reconstruction, did not leak, 
and farmers enthusiastically reported up to five times as much water reaching their fields as 
before. However, by October 1978. the water delivery had drastically declined to only slightly 
above pre-improvement rates. The watercourse sides, because of both poor construction and very 
poor maintenance, had deteriorated considerably and were leaking badly; much water remained 
standing in  the ditch after irrigation and many farmers felt discouraged about the prospects of 
m’aintaining even the present level of efficiency. 
Punjabi Culture: The Game of lzzat 
There is no doubt that one source of the problems faced by this project is the relationship that 
developed between the farmers and the government officials supervising the program. Although 
some of these engineers and extension workers have rural backgrounds, their education has 
seemiTgly made them unfit for rural work. Possessing a formal degree and a respectable position 
in the government bureaucracy, they are “officers.”  They create barriers between themselves and 
their clients by wearing western clothes, speaking an urban dialect, and doing all they can to 
create the impression that they possess a superior knowledge and position which ought to be 
respected. When the clients assert .themselves and refuse the officer the respect (read obeisance) 
he claims, conflict arises and the officer‘s low opinion of his clients is confirmed in his mind. This 
kind of relationship between government officials and farmers is not confined to Pakistan. 
Another factor was that the potential benefits of the program were not perceived as equally dis- 
tributed (Doherty and Jodha 1977). Indeed, equal distribution of benefits in a watercourse reconstruction program is impossible to  achieve because of differences in size of landholdings, dif- 
ferences between owners and  tenants, and most crucial, the relatively greater benefits accruing to 
farmers with land at the tail than to those with land at  the head of the watercourse. Even if the 
benefits of reconstruction were distributed equally. one could argue that any rational individual 
will minimize his contribution toward such a collective good because he  cannot be denied its 
benefits even if he  does not invest in the project (Olson 1965). However, the active attempts by the 
step-nephews to sabotage the program, even on other branches in order to prevent others from 
benefiting, and the disputes that developed among persons whose benefits were about equal, 
suggests these factors are insufficient as explanations of the problems encountered, 
A major source is to be sought within the social organization and culture of rural society. Pun- 
jabi rural society is characterized by a set of values and structural mechanisms  which - in relation 
to  their irrigation system - encourage conflict, make it endemic and unavoidable, and thus tend to 
discourage co-operation on a long term basis. These values may have been adaptive before the 
irrigation system but have continued to operate even though they appear maladaptive under pres- 
ent conditions. 
The ancestors of the Gondalpur farmers who were cattle herders and part-time farmers were 
probably not permanent residents of Gondalpur before the British settlement. This settlement 
awarded permanent rights that had not existed before. One characteristic of pre-British Gondal 
society was relative mobility of individuals and families: larger local groups were unstable as peo- 
ple were free to move and often did move with their animals. The type of situation now known as 
the "tragedy of the commons" (after Hardin 1968). in which individual herdsmen continue to 
increase the size of their individual herds even after the carrying capacity of commonly owned 
grazing lands had been exceeded, did not arise because people were able to leave for less 
crowded, if not greener, pastures. It seems likely that under these conditions it was not necessar- 
ily recognition of overgrazing per se that triggered dispersion but rather a high incidence of social 
conflict maintained  dispersion. 
The most fundamental concept or theme in rural Punjabi culture, in  terms of which much of 
Punjabi behavior can be understood. is i2zatg lzzat may be glossed as "honor," "esteem," "reputa- 
tion,''  "status," or "face." It is a "limited good"  (Foster 1965) and one acquires it only at others' 
expense. As in a zero-sum game, the success of one person is a threat to all the other players, a 
characteristic that generates competition and jealousy. For example, when government officials 
agreed to  a very reasonable request for a double-width culvert for truck access to one of the Khar- 
al's brick kilns, his step-nephew demanded a double-width culvert for himself. Informants said his 
izzat was at stake: if he  got less than his  step-uncle he  would lose izzat. Government personnel, 
not accepting the rules of the local izzat game, rejected his demand, which led to  further problems 
with the man. 
All men wish to avoid losing izzat. but many men also attempt to  increase their own izzat or 
reduce others'. One acquires and increases one's izzat by several different strategies. First, one 
must have the ability and, more importantly, the willingness to use force. There is a famous Pun- 
jabi saying, "Whoever holds the stick owns the buffalo."This  does not necessarily mean force is 
resorted to  frequently; it is enough to create the impression that one is willing and able to use 
force and, in times of tension, much calculation and speculation revolves around this issue. The 
Kharal step-nephews were feared because they had demonstrated their willingness to use force in 
previous fights. The Bhattis of Gondalpur. mostly tenants and poor, in the past also had a high 
'lzzar  is the most common and broadest term; there are others but they tend to have more restricted meanings. The term 
has obvious affinities, conceptual and historical with the Middle Eastern and Mediterranean concept of "honor"(see Peris- 
tany 1966 and Campbell 1964 for examples). 
- 38  - izzat for the same reason. On the other hand, the Khudaya numbardar, despite land holdings, his 
official position, and several adult brothers, had less izzat then he might have had because it was 
known he feared violence. This was not an unreasonable fear since his father had been murdered 
in 1962. 
A second means of acquiring izzat is possession of inftuence with government officials, and wil- 
lingness to use it for one’s supporters and against one’s enemies. The Kharal step-nephews, some 
Pindi landlords, and a recently deceased poor and landless Bhatti leader before his death, all had a 
substantial amount of izzat from this source (as did the author). A third source is willingness to 
entertain guests lavishly, whether they are government officials or relatives at a wedding - even to 
the point of bankruptcy. The deceased Bhatti leader mentioned above kept himself bankrupt but 
high in izzat by this strategy. 
Success in competition, whether in organized games such as kabadi or in  a stick fight, is 
another source of izzat. Winning, not a valiant loss, is the key. Another source is generosity. not to 
the general public, but towards individuals (who  are obliged then to render support).”  Finally, 
successful one-upmanship, including revenge for a previous defeat or insult is important. For 
example, disputes are often taken to the police; the person or group that can avoid jail or being 
beaten by the police, while getting the opponent punished and spending the least money doing it, 
”wins.”  Such cases often become very long, involved, and expensive but they continue even when 
people are aware that after so much trouble and expense they will have nothing tangible to show. 
In order to improve izzat, tagaf (strength or power) is needed, but taqat alone is insufficient; it is 
also necessary to use this power to help clients or defeat enemies. The richest of the Kharals has 
less izzat than one would predict from his wealth and government contacts because he is unwil- 
ling to use his position in  this way. A person whose taqat and izzat are increasing attracts follow- 
ers and allies who hope to benefit, but he also attracts the jealousy and fear of others who are 
likely to band together behind the scenes to plot strategies to limit or reduce him. If a group (such 
as a biradari) or several brothers become too powerful, efforts are made to sow dissension and 
thus weaken their unity. Because individuals’ primary loyalties are to themselves - and each one 
assumes this to be true of others - efforts to divide groups, or even two brothers, often succeed. 
People informally recognized as leaders are supposed to work for the benefit of their followers 
as a group. But more often than notsuch persons keep their own interests in mind first and attract 
clients by aiding individuals (against their enemies or with the police, for example) who are then 
obliged to them. Only infrequently do leaders work for the benefit of a group or community as a 
whole - and even when they do, others may accuse them of seeking only their own benefit. 
Opposition is often expressed verbally in terms of  issues, but in fact the issue is nearly always a 
pretext: men oppose or support decisions and programs based on their perceptions of their com- 
petitors’ position. For example, even though all farmers suffered the exactions of a corrupt tube- 
well operator, they did nothing because, informants explained, if one man or group proposed peti- 
tioning for his removal, others would oppose. This would be done not out of love for the tubewell 
operator but to prevent the others from gaining some advantage from the issue or to pursue some 
long-standing grudge. This can he carried further: the non-cooperative behavior of the Kharal on 
branch A during the watercourse reconstruction was interpreted by informants as based on a 
desire to prevent others from benefiting - even if it means foregoing their own potential benefits. 
There is a Punjabi saying, “If  my neighbor’s wall falls, it is good - even if it falls on  me.” Opposition 
is never legitimate in the western parliamentary sense: it is always personal (or interpreted as 
personal) and aimed at weakening others or strengthening one’s own position. 
“Religious  generosity such as building a mosque earns one ”respect“ iabadl for piety. but is not itself a source of izzat; 
pious acts score points in a different game. 
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for their benefit. Marriage within the biradari - siblings and cousins exchange children - is 
intended to cement their affections and relationships. Divisions within the community, in Gondal- 
pur and other villages, are usually between biradaris. This was the case for most disputes over the 
watercourse reconstruction program. There is a feeling that a biradari's izzat must be protected 
from others' attacks, and if a man's izzat suffers at the hands of a member of a different biradari, 
all of his close kinsmen may unite in opposition to the "enemy." 
Nevertheless, despite the emphasis on loyalty to one's kinsmen, tensions among biradari 
members are always present. Patrilateral cousins and brothers often have tense and competitive 
relationships and do not completely trust each other. One's brother's or cousin's personal izzat is 
not necessarily one's own: hence, a man is apt to be jealous of and feel threatened by a brother's 
success. Tension is also generated among biradari members by joint potential rights in land. One 
of the worst cases of conflict in  Gondalpur history, resulting in two murders and three executions, 
occurred within the Khudaya biradari over land: one branch attempted to deprive another branch 
of rights to some land. Tensions built up and the latter finally took action by murdering the num- 
bardar and his brother. The amount of land involved was in  fact not great; the real issue was izzat. 
If the second group had allowed itself to be deprived of the land, its members' izzat would have 
been severely damaged.' ' 
During the improvement process there was much petty conflict among biradari members over 
work shares and the like; the Kharal are seriously divided, and the Khudaya only slightly less so. 
The Awan and Muradke, though separate biradaris in one sense, are closely intermarried, yet. at 
the time of this project, they were involved in conflict over several issues which prevented them 
from cooperating on the project. 
The sense of community within the village is real but alsct intertwined  with izzat. In opposition to 
outsiders, villagers will act together in a stick fight or a competitive game to preserve the izzat of 
the village. However, cooperation within a community to achieve a mutually beneficial goal is very 
difficult as people fear others may benefit more than they or the leaders will gain undue influence. 
In some villages there are leaders who are sufficiently trusted (or feared) to insure that farmers 
cooperate to  maintain their watercourse, but this is not true of most communities and is not a 
permanent characteristic of any community.'2 
"The numbardar and the cousing with whom he argued over the extent of work on the watercourse are the sons of the 
two murdered men; their relations are tense in part because of jealousy and idssatisfaction over the subsequent partition- 
ing of their fathers' land; and in part because each fears the other will gain an advantage. An exchange of sisters would 
seem to be called for here but each branch is marrying matrilaterally (outside the villagel. thus accentuating the division. 
"One  Pakistani commentator on an earlier draft of this chapter, as well as one of my Gondalpur informants with whom I 
discussed my conceptualization of  ikat. suggested that I  have confused what my informant calls "false izzat"  with "true 
izzat." "True" izzat refers to the more positive characteristics included in the concept. while "false:  izzat includes more 
negative behaviors such as undercutting others, and creating fear in others. It is important to note that my informant hers 
is one of the Langah. who are not acfive participants in the main game of izzat. Other Gondalpur informants. while under- 
standing the distinction. insist neverlheless that obstructionists like the step-nephews do have izzat in most peoples' eyes; 
men who are feared to as badmash (bad character, trouble-maker, bully) are also respected (even admired) and regarded as 
having inat: and the badmash themselves believe they are increasing their izzat by their behavior, 
- 40  - Social Organization on Other Waterco~rses’~ 
During 1.978, I  collaborated in a study of the social organization of ten reconstructed water- 
courses in Punjab. We deliberately chose our sample so as to include several problem and several 
model watercourses. We also chose watercourses for which a maximum period of time had 
elapsed since improvement (the range was four months to two years), and which represented sev- 
eral different agronomic areas of the province. The purpose of the study was to identify those 
sociological characteristics of rural society that both promote and inhibit effective cooperation on 
watercourse rehabilitation and maintenance. The results complement the intensive research 
reported above. Mirza and Merrey (1979)  provide a detailed discussion of the methods and results 
of the research. Here only a brief summary of the conclusion is possible. 
We discovered that both the ease and completeness of the actual reconstruction process, and 
the quality of the maintenance after improvement, vary considerably. Furthermore, there are sys- 
tematic relationships between the relative success of improvement and maintenance quality, and 
also between these and certain sociological characteristics. Watercourses whose improvement 
was completed without significantdelay or disruptive conflict are generally better maintained than 
those where the improvement process has been difficult. The better maintained watercourses 
tend to have all or most of the following characteristics: 
1.  A large percentage of farmers with the landholdings in the 2.5  to 70 hectare range. We 
defined holdings in this range as “small but economically viable“  in irrigated Punjab. Water- 
courses dominated by farmers below this range seem to be very difficult to organize for coopera- 
tive programs, perhaps because they are less committed to farming as a full-time occupation. 
Larger farmers usually have laborers do their share of the watercourse work, with the result that it 
is often done carelessly. Large farmers are also more able to violate sanctions, and are more 
involved in  conflict. 
2.  Relatively equal distribution of power and influence among farmers on a watercourse. “Power 
and influence” was measured by asking sample farmers to rate all the other farmers on the 
watercourse and adding the scores. Where influence is more equally distributed, and one or a few 
farmers do not dominate, farmers seem to cooperate better on collective projects.  0 
3.  A large percentage of farmers being perceived by fellow shareholders as having some influ- 
ence andpower. On some watercourses, power and influence scores were uniformly low - no one 
commanded any respect. Cooperation on such watercourses was much less than on  those where 
the scores were higher across the board; that is, where most shareholders have at least some 
standing and respect. 
4. Concentration of power and influence at the tail or at the tail and middle of the watercourse. 
Farmers at  the tail of a watercourse usually receive the greatest benefits from improvements and 
are thus more highly motivated. If these farmers have comparatively greater influence, they often 
insure maximum cooperation by others. 
5.  Progressiveness of the community. This is measured as the percentage of farmers with a bet- 
ter than primary education, number of institutional services available in  the community, and per- 
centage of farmers who listen to the radio regularly. These three components together were used 
as a measure of community attitudes toward modernization and change. 
13Some of the material in this section was first presented in D  Merrey (1980).  but the implications  are developed further 
here 
41 6. Previous history of co-operation on  community projects, and  lack of serious recent conflict. 
Communities that had successfully cooperated on previous projects - such as building a school - 
and which had not been divided by serious conflict in recent years, cooperate more effectively on 
watercourse rehabilitation and maintenance. 
7. A small  number of  shareholders on  the watercourse. On the watercourses with the largest 
number of shareholders - even if they all belonged to one biradari - getting the farmers to work 
together to rebuild and maintain their watercourse proved very difficult. 
8. Membership of most of the shareholders in  a single biradari, 
In reality the ideal characteristics listed above are not found very often in rural Punjab. None of 
the watercourses in  our sample were well-maintained,  but those which were comparatively better 
maintained share more of these characteristics than those which were in poor condition. None of 
the watercourses had an effective organizational mechanism to insure that all shareholders did 
their share of the cleaning. On five of the ten watercourses studied, the reconstruction work had 
not even been completed because of conflict among the shareholders or between the farmers and 
government engineers. Our study shows that quality of  improvement and maintenance is closely 
related to sociological characteristics of the watercourses, but it also shows that present forms of 
organization are not adequate to insure good maintenance of the system, even on relatively 
conflict-free watercourses. 
Punjab villages exhibit a considerable variety of structural forms: single, double, and multi- 
biradari villages; villages with strong leaders and those with weak leaders; villages with no recent 
history of serious conflict and others where murders occur yearly; and villages of small, medium, 
and large farmers, as well as owners and tenants; and, a few villages.,where landholding distribu- 
tion is fairly equal and many where the pattern is highly skewed in favor of a few farmers. Gon- 
dalpur’s social organization included all of the characteristics shown in  the later study to be least 
conducive to successful cooperation on a watercourse reconstruction project. 
However, in contrast with the variation in  social organization, there is relatively little variation in 
cultural va)ues: the concept of izzat is shared to a large extent by all rural Punjabis but it leads to 
the pursuit of different strategies depending on the social context. Both of the studies together 
show that the organizational and cultural impediments to a cooperative program - such as water- 
course reconqtruction - are serious indeed, and even if the watercourse is successfully rebuilt, the 
inability of the users to maintain it means the investment in reconstruction may be wasted. How- 
ever, one can go further than this: these organizational and cultural impediments, together with 
the ineffectiveness of the overly centralized bureaucratic management structure of the system, are 
at the root of the  low productivity of the system; the minimal payoffs from the huge amount of 
capital invested in dams, canals, and SCARP tubewells; and, to an undetermined but probabiy very 
large extent,the waterlogging and salinization -the  processes of desertification. 
Conclusion 
For decades, research and development projects on Pakistan’s irrigation system have focused 
solely on  the perceived  technical problems and on their solution by means of large scale capital. 
intensive purely technological approaches. The users of the water - the farmers - have beBn 
ignored. In the 197Os, as a result of the research efforts of a number of American and Pakistani 
scientists, local-level problems and inefficiencies began to be recognized. However, initially this 
research too focused solely on technical problems such as watercourse leakage and rehabilitation. 
Experience with pilot watercourse reconstruction projects soon demonstrated that farmer coopera- 
tion was the key to the success of the projects. The focus on farmer cooperation, on which little 
research had been done, led to an increasing level of collaboration of sociologists and 
- 42 - anthropologists with the engineers, agronomists, and irrigation specialists in an attempt to 
develop and effective watercourse program. It was expected that about a dozen experimental 
Water User Associations would be'organized under existing laws and their activities monitored. 
The end-product was to be recommendations for forms of organization to be used for establishing 
associations of irrigators for improving local level water management (see Mirza and Merrey 
1979). However, the cut-off of American aid to Pakistan in 1980, as well as various political devel- 
opments in  that country, made it seem extremely unlikely that this program would be carried out 
in the foreseeable future.14 
This work was based on the assumption that such tinkering with the system could be effective 
in improving its productivity as a whole, and reversing the process of decline and desertification in 
the form of declining levels of maintenance at all levels, and waterlogging and salinity. This 
assumption now seems highly questionable. The technical problems of the system cannot be 
solved as if they were isolated from the larger social, cultural, and economic context. This point 
may appear obvious to a social scientist but it does not generally characterize development poli- 
cies and programs, especially of relatively conservative countries such as Pakistan. 
The "engineering mentality" has been carried over from the older style development projects 
such as dam construction to the more people-oriented programs. For example, the planners of the 
pilot watercourse reconstruction project in Pakistan believed their own rhetoric that farmers' per- 
ceptions of their self-interest in watercourse reconstruction would overcome long-standing social 
and cultural impediments. The social scientists were called in somewhat later and expected to 
carry out rapid surveys (complete with statistics) to identify the problems and propose solutions to 
insure the success of the project. Social scientists, can, it is true, often identify social and cultural 
impediments to seemingly useful projects, and social and cultural factors involved in processes of 
environmental deterioration, and, having identified the problems, they can suggest strategies to 
overcome them. There are undoubtedly many situations where this narrowly conceived role is 
quite adequate, but Pakistan's irrigation system is not one of them. 
In my discussion of the various recommendations and development projects in  the lndus Basin, I 
have drawn attention to the fact that none have dealt with the most fundamental issue: the organ- 
ization of the system. The study of organization comprehends the nesting of local systems in larger 
systems, and the complex relationships among social structure, values, technology, and environ- 
ment. A beginning has been made in  this direction with the various proposals to decentralize the 
management of the system and to organize water users into viable as~ociations.~~  but these are 
very preliminary and are based on as thin a data base as are many of the technological.solutions 
now being implemented. A great deal more research is needed on the organization of the system 
at all levels, and especially on social constraints and cultural perceptions and motivation. Such 
research can be used to develop a more comprehensive and realistic model of how the lndus sys- 
tem actually operates. Based on this model, alternative forms of organization can be suggested. 
Pakistan's irrigation system - indeed that nation as a whole - is in  crisis. Poor management and 
maintenance of the system at all levels, waterlogging and salinization, low productivity despite 
capital-intensive inputs (e.9.. dams, wells, fertilizer, tractors), and the socio-economic inequalities 
which have increased in recent years as a result of "green revolution"  technological changes 
(Nulty 1972)  are all facets of the same fundamental problem: inadequate and inappropriate organ- 
ization. Capital-intensive technologica1,projects are unlikely to lead to any substantial development 
of the lndus Food Machine unless accompanied by substantial and effective social and economic 
reorganization. 
14Although the experimental work proposed under that project was not continued, the provinces of Pakistan have adopted 
laws to facilitate forming water users associationson watercourses, and are attempting with donor assistance to organize 
associations. 
15See Radosevich (1975);  Water Management Research Project (1976):  Reuss, Skogerboe. and D. Merrey (1979):  and D. 
Merrey (1983. THE SOCIOLOGY OF WARABAMDI:  A CASE STUDY FROM PAKISTAN 
Douglas J.  Merrey' 
The Problem 
This paper uses a case study to address a fundamental issue in irrigation management: the rela- 
tionship between technology and the organization required to use that technology productively. 
When an irrigation system is  developed over time by a local community, the technology and the 
organization evolve together. However, when engineers design and construct large scale irrigation 
systems, there is a tendency to concentrate on the civil works, and to assume that, at least on the 
local level, whatever organization is required will evolve by itself. This was the assumption of the 
designers of the large irrigation systems built by the British and post colonial governments in 
present day Pakistan and the northwestern states of India. 
Warabandi refers specifically to the roster of turns for taking water along the watercourses of 
these Indian and Pakistani irrigation systems. Basically, the irrigation system delivers a constant 
but limited quantity of water at  the head of a watercourse. Farmers then take the full supply of 
water for a period of time proportional to the size of their landholding, at  a specific time once a 
week. Since the amount of water supplied is far less than required to irrigate the whole area dur- 
ing the week, each farmer has to adjust his cropping pattern to the expected quantity of water. 
In India the warabandi system has been seen by some irrigation specialists as a panacea to 
severe problems on irrigation systems outside the northwestern states (Singh 1980). However, 
whatever the merits of the system in northern India and Pakistan, it has proven extremely difficult 
to implement outside of this region. Even within the region, there are few detailed studies of the 
actual operation of warabandi (Malhotra 1982). 
The present paper contributes to filling this gap in our knowledge of warabandi. Based on 
detailed field work in a village in Punjab Province, Pakistan, it takes an historical perspective on 
how the route of a particular watercourse, and the rotations on that watercourse, have evolved 
over time. It demonstrates the lack of "fit"  or congruence between the imposed irrigation technol- 
ogy and the pre-existing social organization of the village. The attempts by some water users to 
adapt both the route and the rotation to solve social conflicts have proven unsatisfactory. 
An Overview of Pakistan's Irrigation System 
The Irrigation System. The Punjab (Pakistan) irrigation system uses barrages to divert water 
from the rivers into the canals. The canals are designed for~continuous  operation at or near full 
capacity. They can be closed for repairs, during floods, or to conserve water in times of shortage, 
but the amount of flow cannot be regulated on demand. Water flows continuously from the main 
canals into distributaries and through ungated concrete outlets (mogha) into watercourses and 
finally into farmers'~ditches  and onto the fields. As an indication of the size of the main canals, the 
Lower Jhelum Canal has a discharge at the head of 151 cumecs and commands 628.000 hec- 
tares. Distributariesare designed with capacities up to 5,660 liters per second (l/s).  They are the 
lowest level channels directly controlled by the Irrigation Department. Since distributaries have 
gates, rotations can be instituted in times of water shortage. The moghas are ungated modular 
outlets designed to deliver fixed amounts of water up to 113 I/s (4 cusecs) into watercourses, 
'Social Scientist, International Irrigation Management Institute, Digana Village via Kandy, Sri Lanka 
44 usually at a rate of about .21 liters per second/hectare (one cusec for 350  - 400  acres). 
On average, each watercourse irrigates about 225 hectares of land, usually cultivated by about 
50  farmers. The route and command area of each watercourse is laid out by the Irrigation Depart- 
ment, and legally can be changed only with its sanction; but the building, maintenance, and man- 
agementof the watercourse are the responsibility of the farmers in its command area. Each 
farmer has a right to water proportional to the size of his land holding. 
The irrigation system was originally designed to operate with a minimum of human regulation 
or interference. Aside from engineering considerations the British believed that a flexible system 
of water distribution would lead to uncontrollable abuses. They also wished to keep construction 
and operational costs at a minimum since they were interested in a quick return on their invest- 
ment. These considerations also underlay the minimal local intervention: farmers were expected 
to build and maintain their watercourses and settle disputes themselves. Under the Canal and 
Drainage Act of 1873,  still the basic irrigation law, the Irrigation Department retains considerable 
residual power, but this is only rarely used upon farmers’ appeal (Jahania 1973).  The major irriga- 
tion method remains flooding of small basins, as originally recommended by the Irrigation 
Department (Trevaskis 1931  :293). 
Efficient continuous operation of the system requires, at the local level, that a minimum of three 
tasks be accomplished: regular system maintenance; water allocation; and conflict management 
(Coward 1980:19).  Regular cleaning and maintenance of watercourses, including de-silting, remo- 
val of weeds, and repair of banks, is essential because the earthen channels deteriorate rapidly, 
leading to high water losses. Water flow must be rotated because the rate and volume of flow is 
inadequate to allow irrigation from all the outlets simultaneously. Finally, conflict over shares in 
maintenance work and rotation of water, and accusations of water theft are inevitable, and dictate 
some means to resolve disputes and insure equitable sharing of water and costs of operation. The 
government did not make any provision for local institutions to fulfill these tasks. Given the princi- 
ples of non-interference in local affairs and minimum bureaucracy, cultivators must depend on 
their own cultural traditions to fulfill these tasks. 
. 
LandDemarcarion. As part of the colonization of new land through irrigated agriculture, the 
Punjab government established a policy to survey all the land and lay down squares on a common 
base line for the whole commanded area of each canal project. At the time the Lower Jhelum 
Canal was being built (1897  to 191 7)  it was decided to compel farmers in  the old villages to con- 
form to this requirement too, as a pre-condition to receiving canal irrigation. Accordingly, during 
the 1905-06  settlement in  Gondalpur (a pseudonym), the village where I  worked, all of the land 
was resurveyed and field boundaries were moved to conform to a grid’pattern (Hailey 1907:l-2). 
This involved imposing a grid of squares lmurabah) which, within each mama (revenue village), 
are numbered consecutively beginning in the northwest portion. Each square is further subdivided 
into 25 numbered killa, as shown in the key to Map I.  This process was called killabandi. or “recti- 
fication.”’  The corners of the squares are marked by permanent concrete posts. Although the 
squares are not all exactly equal in size (Hailey 1907:2).  they are supposed to be approximately 
11.2  hectares, so each killa is about 0.45  hectares. 
Today, most people know the location of their fields by the square and killa number; and the 
fields do form a grid even though the actual lines have shifted somewhat with time. The grid pat- 
tern does makes resolution of disputes over land boundaries easier. The watercourses also usually 
follow the grid lines with official turnouts usually located on the corners of squares. 
’See  Douie (1960 Appendix XlV) for a complete description of the process Construction and  Operation of Watercourses. Map 1 shows the square numbers and the loca- 
tion of the residential area, paths, the railroad line, and the three watercourses found in Gondal- 
pur. The watercourse routes shown,are the official ones, as of 1976. They ere approximately, but 
not exactly. accurate. Farmers' ditches to carry water from the watercourse to their fields are not 
shown; they form an intricate pattern since nearly every killa is irrigated. The low-lying land to the 
east of the Miani path, and north of the Pirpur path, was more valuable than higher land before 
canal irrigation was introduced, since rain water could be impounded; but today it is inferior to the 
rest of the village land because much of it is wateriogged and/or  saline. 
The system was not designed to irrigate all of the land during any one season. The Lower Jhe- 
lum Canal was designed for a total cropping intensity of 75% per year. The actual sown area, 
however, tended to average over 95% per year (Rudkin 191  1:9). Watercourses on the Lower Jhe- 
lum  Canal were designed to carry an average of 28.3  I/s  (1 cusec) for every 142 hectares. Accord- 
ing to Trevaskis (1  931  :293) the Irrigation Department assumed 1 cusec would irrigate 0.4 hec- 
tares (1 acre) in 1  pehr;  that is, 3 hours. "Irrigate" here is defined as covering 0.4 hectares with 
7.6 centimeters of water. By this standard, a maximum of 3.2 hectares can be irrigated in  one 24 
hour day. and 22.7 hectares in a 7 day rotation. This would mean only 16% of the command area 
could be irrigated in a week, and it would take 3 weeks to irrigate 50% of the commanded area. 
Given the high moisture deficit in  the region, the shortage of water relative to area and crop 
water requirements necessitates a rationing system in order to distribute water widely and-equit- 
ably. As every farmer on a watercourse has a right to water proportional to the size of his holding, 
water is rationed,according to a rotation, usually of seven days. Within this period, each farmer is 
supposed to have sole access to the water flow during a fixed period of time. The rotation always 
begins with the farmers located at the head and proceeds to the tail of the watercourse. 
. 
In most cases, the farmers themselves established the first rotation. Farmer-established  rota- 
tions are called kachcha,  meaning impermanent, having no legal basis, or informal, while those 
established by the Irrigation Department under its own rules are calledpakka,  meaning solid, 
legal, regulated, or formal. Through the 1950s. the rotations in Gondalpur remained informal, and 
the rotation on the middle one is still informal in practice. 
Informants say that unlike the formal rotation, the informal rotation takes into consideration 
local conditions such as the sandiness of  soils and the height of the field relative to the ditch. 
Thus, a sandy or high field is awarded extra time to ensure it can be irrigated. More time is also 
allowed for filling long sections of the watercourse. However, an informal rotation seems to work 
only when there are relatively few irrigators, as in the past in Gondalpur, or where one or two irri- 
gators  have sufficient authority to enforce it. This is the case on the middle watercourse in  Gon- 
dalpur, dominated by several large Pindi Village landlords who find the system advantageous. 
In some cases, the one man in  whose name the time is recorded has been succeeded by a 
number of sons and nephews; these individuals must then agree upon an informal rotation among 
themselves. There are several examples of this in Gondalpur. If some or all of the farmers become 
dissatisfied with a rotation, they can petition the Irrigation Department to set up a new one, as has 
happened on two  of the Gondalpur watercourses. 
This formal rotation is set up by the lowest Irrigation Department official on the revenue side, 
the canal clerk /patwar;)  and confirmed by a higher official when all the irrigators agree. It is estab- 
lished according to formal procedures laid down by the Irrigation Department (Jahania 1973: 
Appendix VIII). Basically, after allowing lead time for filling sections of the watercourse, the clerk 
divides the number of minutes in a seven day rotation by the total area irrigated to arrive at  the 
number of minutes per hectare to be allowed. He then awards the amount of time to individual 
land owners according to the total amount of land they irrigate. The rotation on the main water- 
course in  Gondalpur, for example, allows 14.43 minutes per 0.4 hectares. 
-46. Map 1. Routes of Watercourses,  Gondalpur.  1976. Based on  1910-11 revised settlement  map 
and 1977 observations. 
- 47 Every April 1, under Irrigation Department rules, the irrigation times shift forward and backward 
in alternate years, so that those who irrigate during the night one year will irrigate during the day 
the following year. However, the formal rotation does not allow for differences in soil or height of 
the field, or for losses of water due to seepage or leaking from the watercourse. This means the 
farmers near the tail of the branches do not get as much water per hectare as those at the head, 
and this difference in water supply is reflected in differences in cropping patterns and intensity 
and in land value. 
In the Pakistani system there are no "ditch tenders," government or community officials divert- 
ing the water or overseeing the rotation; each man closes and opens outlets himself. Therefore, 
not surprisingly. taking water out of turn and trading water rights, though against Irrigation 
Department rules, are common practices3 I observed a number'of  cases, and heard of others, in 
which farmers near the head opened outlets onto their land during others.'turns. This often leads 
to disputes and arguments, but I  never observed any serious fights caused by this. This is because 
the watercourses are long, so the irrigator may not know of the theft; and people are careful about 
whose water, and how much, they take. 
Trading, even by people on different branches, is-also common. A man often needs more water 
than he is allotted one week, and less than he is allocated the next. Trading is therefore a way of 
making a formal rotation more flexible in  practice. The Irrigation Department never takes action 
against trading or theft unless it receives formal complaints from the farmers. Another reason for 
trading water is that a farmer often has several pieces of land located on different parts of the 
watercourse. but all of his time is allocated at once. Time is allotted to people, not parcels of land.4 
(This is discussed further below.) 
When asked how much time it takes to irrigate 0.4  hectare of land, the responses of farmers 
varied considerably. Generally, those near the division box of the three branches within Gondalpur 
(Map 1) said it takes 1.5 - 2 hours if the watercourse is clean and the tubewell running; on the 
middle and tail reaches the estimates ranged from 2 - 4 hours, with the same conditions. Since 
the rotation allows less than 15  minutes for 0.4 hectares, no one can irrigate all or even half his 
land in one turn, and farmers at the tail are able to irrigate only a small portion of their land. 
One other notable characteristic of Gondalpur's watercourses is that all three originate in other 
villages controlled by relatively large and powerful landowners. The main watercourse originates 
on and runs along the line between Pirpur Village and Chak Aziz Village. Although there is no offi- 
cial outlet on the main branch leading to the division box among the three branches within Gon- 
dalpur. Pirpur and Chak Aziz landlords owning the adjacent land cut the banks and take water with 
impunity. The Chak Aziz branch runs through the land of three relatively powerful (and in one case 
ruthless) families of Chak Aziz; they too often take water out of turn, and refuse to do their share 
of maintenance. 
3Lowdermilk el  al. 11978 [11]:36) and Lowdermilk et ?I.  (1975:54-56) show that trading of turns on watercourses is 
common. 
%he  Canal and Draingage Ac1 provides for two procedures: outlet by outlet (nakka bynahka) process. and turns by  holding 
(rozwari). In the former. if a man's holdings are fragmented he gets separate turns for each fragment along a watercourse 
(see Reidinger 1974). In the latter. time is largest fragment. The Act says that the shareholders may choose the procedure 
they wish to follow. See Jahania I1  973:96).  See also Lowdermilk et al. (1  978 [l11:34-351  for a slightly different diefinition of 
rozawari. 
- 4% The other two watercourses begin in Pindi Village, and irrigate the land of several powerful 
landlords who own land in  both Pirpur and Gondalpur; many Gondalpur people are their tenants 
and clients, and depend on them for access to land as well as help with the bureaucracy. Even 
landowners on these watercourses are in  a dependent (client) relationship with the Pindi land- 
lords. The analysis in this paper concentrates on the main watercourse. 
The Main Watercourse in  Gondalpur 
Gondalpur village. Gondalpur is the pseudonym I  use for a village in central Punjab where my 
wife and I resided and carried out research for 18 months in 1976-77. It is located on the Chaj 
Doab, the area between the Jhelum and Chenab Rivers. Its existence predates the first British 
colonial records on the village, in 1857. It grew rapidly. primarily due to immigration, during the 
decades before the turn of the century. Gondalpur began receiving water from the Lower Jhelum 
Canal in 1904, and within a few years all of the land in the village was under cultivation. 
The dominant landowners, the Gondals, are divided into four named biradari, or brotherhoods, 
which are local co-resident groups based on a combination of patrilineal descent and marriage 
(Alavi 1972). The biradari members' lands tend to be concentrated on different branches of the 
watercourse, with some mixture. Table 1 summarizes the size and location of the lands of each 
biradari. Although in this paper I speak of land belonging to this or that biradari, land is registered 
in individuals' names, and patrilateral relatives hold residue1 rights. (For detailed discussions of vil- 
lage history and social organization, see Merrey 1982, 1983, 1986). 
a/  Table 1. Biradaris on the main watercourse. 
Position on  b/  Number of  Watercourse 
Households  People  branch  branch 
Gondalpur biradaris: 
Gondal-Khudaya  11  70  0;  a little on 8  H.M.T 
Gondal-Khizarane  212  105  B  H.  M. T 
H.  M. T  Gondal-Muradke  7  43 
GondaCMiane  5  36  'D; a little on A  M. T 
Langah  5  36  A  M 
Awan  11  47  8 and C  M. 
Bhani-Rajeaned  18  7a  B (2 households)  M 
Sayid  3  25  B  H.  M 




Kharal (Chak Aziz)  3  ?  A;  a linle on  B  H 
3  Pindi biradarise'  under 10  7  A&D  Ton both 
Notes: Branches: A - Chak Aziz.  B - Khizarane. C - Muradke. 0 - Khudaya. H - Head, M - Middle, T - Tail. a/ 
This is not a complete list of all biradaris in Gondalpur; only those having land i rigated by the reconstructed 
watercour  are listed. Values are based on 1977 complete household census. '/  See Map 1. c/  Very small 
holdings. "Only  two households of this biradari have land on  this waterco  rse There are 7 Bhani biradaris 
in Gondalpur with a total of 90  households and 416 people as of  1977.  These biradaris did not play an 
important role in the improvement project - their major holdings are on other watercourses; they generally 
acted together on this project. 
eY'. .. 
- 49 - The main watercourse, like others in Pakistan, was constructed by the farmers themselves, on a 
route laid out by the Irrigation Department at the time the Lower Jhelum Canal was built. The 
main channel, officially sanctioned by the Irrigation Department, is called the sarkari khal. or offi- 
cial watercourse. Its route cannot legally be altered without prior official approval. Map 2 shows 
the route of the official watercourse as it appeared until the early 1960s: there is no evidence of 
any changes taking place, and the official map of the SCARP tubewel15 constructed in 1965 indi- 
cates the organization that built it, the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), had not 
been informed of changes made at that time 
I  I  1 
Map 2. Original Route of Main Watercourse Gondalpur 
5The Salinity Control and Reclamation Program (SCARP), implemented in stages since the early 1960s. involves the instal- 
lation of large publicly managed tubewells in areas of high water table. Water is pumped into watercourses (unless it is too 
saline) to provide extra irrigation. GondalDur is in the SCARP II area. See Johnson 11982)  for an economic analysis of this 
program. 
50 As Map 2 shows, the main watercourse has several major branches. The main branch follows 
the boundary between Chak Aziz and Pirpur villages to a three-way division box. The right hand 
(eastern side) branch was and still is called the Khizarane nali(Khizarane's channel), since it 
primarily irrigates land owned by members of the Khizarane biradari. The middle branch used to 
be called the vichalinali(center channel), and was used primarily to irrigate land owned by 
members of Muradke. Khudaya, and Miane biradaris. This branch still exists, but is shorter, and is 
now called the Muradke branch. The third branch used to be called the urali(high)  or dingi 
(crooked)  nali. It used to irrigate the high land owned today by a Chak Aziz village landlord, as well 
as land owned by the Langah biradari, and some Pindi village landlords. The other branch near the 
outlet irrigated the remainder of the land owned by the landlords of Chak Aziz. The routes of these 
two branches have been significantly altered in recent years. 
Although there were apparently no changes made in the route of the official watercourse, the 
cultivators did add many unofficial ditches and turnouts over the years. For example, about 40 
years ago,  in  squares 42 and 41 (Map 2). a Langah man built a long unofficial ditch from the dingi 
nalito irrigate land officially commanded by the center branch. This ditch now links both branches. 
Similarly, in squares 32 and 31, the Miane biradari people have built extra ditches so that they can 
bring water from either branch (dinginalior center) to their fields located between the two, 
though their irrigation time is officially on the center branch. Further, although only one turnout 
per square is permitted on official channels, there has been a tremendous proliferation of loca- 
tions where the channels are cut: this is true on most watercourses in Pakistan.' 
The total cultivable commanded area (CCA). or potentially irrigated area, of the main water- 
course is 275 hectares. This is called its chakbandi. Of this, 35.6 hectares are in Chak Aziz,  near 
the head, while 9.9~  hectares are at the tail end in Pindi. The remaining 229.5 hectares are in 
Gondalpur itself. However, because of waterlogging and other problems discussed below, not all 
of the commanded area within Gondalpur is irrigated by this watercourse. I estimate that only 150 
hectares, about 55% of the commanded area within Gondalpur is actually irrigated in most years.7 
In other words, of the total 275 commanded hectares on this watercourse, only about 200 hec- 
tares, or 70  - 75% of the total is irrigated. 
Until 1961, the rotation on this watercourse was an unofficial kachcha warabandi. There is no 
record available today of  how this rotation worked. Informants say that if the canal water stopped 
for some time. the person in line for the next turn would be the first to get the water. Thus, rota- 
tions were not necessarily on fixed days. Similarly, specific data are unavailable on the level of 
conflict over water or on the level or effectiveness of maintenance. Informants made general 
statements that there used to be many quarrels, usually over rotation times (attributed to the lack 
of preciseness of thepehr system), and sometimes over water theft, but they insisted these did not 
lead to major problems and did not affect the ability of the farmers to cooperate in  channel main- 
tenance. They claim the channel was better maintained before the installation of the SCARP 
tubewell, as before that water was short and frequent cleaning was essential to get water. 
Developments Since 1960. Conflicts within and among biradaris in Gondalpur became intense 
in the late 1950s. culminating in  a double murder in 1962 (Merrey 1983).  Conflicts and tensions 
have continued since then, and two members of the Kharal family in  Chak Aziz have also been 
involved. All of the land owning parties in these conflicts have their major holdings on this 
'Lowdermilk  et al. (1979 [111]:26-33)found an average of 2.6 nakka (field turnout) cuts hectare ina  survey of 40 water 
courses in Pakistan. 
7Some of the non-irrigated land is waterlogged, but is cultivated with paddy once a year. 
-51  - watercourse. It is not surprising that watercourse politics have become intertwined with the larger 
political conflic!s  in Gondalpur. Several other factors have had an impact on the operation of the 
watercourse and biradari politics. 
One factor is the increase in population, leading to subdivision of land holdings, necessitating 
more minute subdivision of water rights. This subdivision makes it difficult to maintain an informal 
rotation, and has led throughout Punjab to appeals to  the Irrigation Department to  create official 
rotations. Related to this subdivision is  a second factor, the purchase of land by people of other 
biradaris, leading to an increase in  the mixture of biradaris on the watercourse. For example the 
Kharal of Chak Aziz village have acquired small plots of land here and there in Gondalpur; Pindi 
village people have bought land from some of the Khudaya involved in the 1962 murder; and in 
recent years two Rajeane Bhatti have bought land in several locations on the Khizarane branch. 
These purchases have complicated the rotation and made cooperation for maintenance more diffi- 
cult to  enforce. 
A third factor is the intensification of cultivation, partly a result of increased population pressure 
and facilitated by the introduction of higher yielding varieties of crops: these are far more water- 
sensitive, placing a greater premium on amount and timing of irrigation water. Related to this is 
the fourth factor,  the installation of the SCARP tubewell in 1965  which in effect doubled the water 
supply. Increased water supply has led to an increase in  double cropping and in the area of crops 
requiring large amounts of water, especially rice and sugar cane (Merrey 1983). It also led to an 
increase in  the wastage of water: as on other watercourses supplemented by public tubewells, 
this one was not enlarged to  accommodate the enhanced flow, leading to erosion, overtopping, 
leaking, and washouts. Further, since there was far more water than farmers were accustomed to 
using, the frequency and effectiveness of watercourse cleaning declined. As the watercourse 
deteriorated from both these factors (lack of maintenance and water flow greater than channel 
capacity) the distribution of water became increasingly inequitable: farmers at the tail were proba- 
bly getting half to  a third of the amount available at the head by 1977  (farmers' statements; Low- 
dermilk et al. 1978 [111]:97-99). 
As on other watercourses in Gondalpur, there is a five rupee fine for non-participation in  perio- 
dic cleaning; but while many do not cooperate, I could not find one example of a fine actually col- 
lected. On  the branch passing through Chak Aziz village and Gondalpur to Pindi (lillage, biradaris 
have assigned shares to clean based on the amount of land irrigated. This cleaning is done about 
twice, a year; but the head cultivators, the Kharal of Chak Aziz village, not only avoid their share 
but often sabotage the cleaning of others. On the other branches farmers work together beginning 
at the head, and stop when the section up to their individual plots are clean. With this system 
those near the tail do more'work; and there were many complaints that the ditches are not 
cleaned often or well enough. 
All of these factors have led to three inter-related responses on this watercourse: attempts to 
change the route of the official watercourse to better fit perceptions of the needs and realities of 
social relationships; changes in the rotation of water; and more recently, demands for 
government-aided watercourse rehabilitation. The route changes are also related to the attempts 
of some to use a favorable location on the watercourse as a political weapon. 
Route Changes 
1. Chak Aziz anddingi  branches. The unauthorized ditch built about 40 years ago by a Langah 
man to irrigate his land in squares 41 and 42 has been mentioned above. Informants say this 
route was shorter, and therefore more efficient. However, both this and the legal route pass 
- 52 through land owned by the numbardap family, a relatively powerful group within the Khudaya 
biradari. Several years before the 1962 murder of the previous numbardar, a Langah biradari man 
was suspected of having been involved in  the attempt to burn him and his cousin to death (Merrey 
1983). Therefore, the numbardar destroyed the sections of the Langah ditch passing through his 
land; for two years the Langah man got no crops as he had no water. Later the numbardar allowed 
it to be rebuilt when he discovered the Langah had not been involved in the plot. 
Until the early 1960s. the dinginaliroute remained as shown in Map 2. It ran though land 
owned by the numbardar and Fazal Kharal, of Chak Aziz village; it cut across squares and killas, 
rather than running along the ridges between the fields. Then Fazal arranged a land trade with the 
numbardar to consolidate his land. To facilitate cultivation of his newly consolidated land with a 
tractor, Fazal then convinced the other people on the branch to agree to a major change in the 
route. This was an extension of the previous Chak Aziz branch to replace the dinginali, and runs 
along the ridges between squares, and then along the distributary, as shown in Map 3. 
Map 3.  Changes in Route of  Char Aziz Watercourse Branch. 
Key 
A.  Route of Watercourse branch until rehabilitation project. 1977. 
6.  Route of watercourse as built during rehabilitation project, 1977. which probably reflects 
the route actually sanction by the irrigation deparment in the mid-1  960s. 
Before mid-1960s Ihis watercourse stopped here,  irrigating only Chak Aziz land; it was 
extended from  here  to  Gondalpur  when  the  route  was  changed and  the  dingi  nali 
abandoned. 
C. 
‘Nurnberder  (from the English word “number”) refers to the village resident selected by the Government as its contact 
point in  the village. He collects land revenue and irrigation fees from individuals, based on the revenue and cnal clerks’ 
assessments. The position is normally hereditary  (father to son), subject to Government confirmation. 
- 53 - The Langah biradari's land is located just downstream of Fazal's land. Langah iniormants say 
now that they made a mistake in  agreeing to the change in the route, and accuse Fazal of fraud, 
Since Fazal's land is high, and the new route is also higher, he gets more water than before. How- 
ever, he and his relatives refuse to de-silt the channel regularly because the silt helps raise the 
water level, facilitating irrigation to their fields. The Langah are forced to de-silt the Kharal's share 
as well as their own to get water--but they claim the Kharal then often refill the channel with silt 
again. The Langah can do little as the Kharal are far wealthier and politically more powerful. 
The Langah claim that Fazal got the Irrigation Department's sanction after a new ditch had been 
built. but instead of getting sanction for the route just constructed, he got yet another route sanc- 
tioned along the distributary, behind the residential area of Chak Aziz, and continuing downstream 
along the distributary. The Langah say they did not realize this change had been made when they 
agreed to its sanctioning; after it was authorized; they had no choice but to go along with its 
reconstruction again, along the distributary downstream of the Chak Aziz residential area (the sec- 
tion through this residential area was sanctioned but not built until the watercourse reconstruc- 
tion program in 1977; Merrey 1982).  The Langah probably agreed to these changes out of both 
powerlessness to oppose the Kharal, and faith in  their kinship tie with Fazal, whose mother is a 
Langah. The Langah today have acute water problems, and in 1976-77 were among the most 
enthusiastic supporters of a proposed watercourse reconstruction program. 
2. The Muradke andKhudaya branches. As is shown on Map 2, the Khudaya and Miane birada- 
ris' land in  squares 45, 41, 32, 33, 28, 29, 19-21, etc. used to be irrigated from the center (vichali) 
branch. Today it is shorter, and primarily irrigates Muradke land and some Awan land. The 
Muradke and Awan were initially accused along with the Langah in the first attempt to kill the 
numbardar and his cousin, though they were later exonerated. Nevertheless, several informants 
date the tension between the Khudaya and Muradke from that incident. The tension continued 
after the murder of the numbardar and his cousin (both Khudaya biradari).  The new numbardar 
and his brothers were young and weak then, and other Khudaya feared they would get into trouble 
while irrigating since the water passed through Muradke land while irrigating. They also feared 
the Muradke would attempt to deny them water. Other informants attribute the heightened ten- 
sion to the effect of the first "Union Council" election under the "Basic Democracy"  system. in 
1960, when a Muradke opposed a Khudaya for Gondalpur's seat (the Khudaya won). 
About a year after the murder, about the time the new Chak Aziz branch was under construc- 
tion. the Khudaya built a new watercourse branch, now called the Khudaya branch (see Map 4). 
This new branch utilizes part of the former dingi branch in square 51, and runs northwest through 
the land owned by the Khudaya and Miane (squares 45,41),  to link up with the old section 
through squares 32,29,28,  and beyond. No survey was done, and the ditch was made the same 
depth throughout regardless of land height. A few years later, about 1966, the numbardar got the 
new route sanctioned by the Irrigation Department. 
Not everyone is happy with the new route: the Miane biradari, whose land is relatively high, 
complain they get less water than before, while the numbardar's poor relatives at the tail say they 
also get less water. Nevertheless, the new route accomplished its purpose: the Khudaya now have 
their own channel, which they control right from the division box; they are no longer dependent on 
the Muradkes'good will, and no longer have to pass through their land. Perhaps as a result, the 
Khudaya-Muradke tension has not led to any overt conflict since the early 1960s. 
3. The tailofthe Khizarane branch. At its tail, the Khizarane branch is supposed to irrigate land 
in parts of squares 23,25,  26, 35, and 36. The land furthest from the head of the watercourse is 
relatively high and sandy land, while the intervening land, parts of squares 38-39,34-35, 26-27, 
and 21, are low and waterlogged. Thus the watercourse must pass through this waterlogged low 
land in order to reach the higher sandy land. Much of this higher land is owned by Muradke, 
Rajeane Bhattis, and an urban landlord. The lower land is owned by various people, including 
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a6elp  aqi puoAaq isnl  s0~6  L  aqi u! paioniisuoa seM ll?~  paq~  uqsiad e 'wyaiu! aqi 6uIina Summary. This section has shown how the routes of the watercourse branches have been 
manipulated by more powerful people to gain control over, or to punish, others on the water- 
course. In only one case, the modifications in Chak Aziz village, was an economic benefit also 
important: the changed route enabled Fazal Kharal to better cultivate his land with a tractor, and 
possibly to improve his water supply. However, in the process the Langah supply was reduced, 
and Fazal and his relatives’ power over the Langah enhanced. In the case of the Khudaya. they 
were able to separate themselves from having to cooperate with the Muradke, with whom rela- 
tions were tense; but this was at the expense of a reduced water supply for at least some people. 
On the Khizarane branch, the watercourse was used by the Muradke as a weapon to hurt a person 
of another biradari who had slighted them, i.e.,  struck a blow at their honor /inat).  even though 
their action was at  their own expense as well. All of these changes in  the route of the watercourse 
are inseparable from changes in the rotation, the subject of the next section. 
Changes in the irrigation Rotation: 1961 to 1977 
No record is available today on the informal rotation in  operation on the main watercourse until 
late 1961. Informants say it was broken when people who had acquired land found they did not 
get water,’ and applied to the Irrigation Department to institute a formal rotation @akka wara- 
band/). The first formal rotation, established in late 1961, apparently preceded most of the route 
changes discussed above. There is no indication in  the canal clerk‘s register that this rotation 
included extra lead time for filling the watercourse, suggesting it may have been technically defi- 
cient. This rotation lasted less than five years. It had to be replaced for two reasons: its gross 
inequity, and the changes in watercourse routes, especially the separation of the Khudaya and 
Muradke branches. 
One informant told me that people began complaining almost immediately after the establish- 
ment of this first formal rotation, because of its inequity. He alleged the canal clerk had been 
“influenced”  by certain farmers. His major example was from his own biradari: several holdings 
which were still together in the record books as one holding were given a total of 9 hours of water, 
which was reduced to a more reasonable total of 2.5  hours in  the next rotation. I had thought this 
an exaggeration, but examination of the rotations of 1961 and 1966 in the canal clerk’s register 
confirmed this. There were other similar anomalies, but this was the most obvious one; in  each 
case the inflation occurred by including in the rotation schedule land not actually irrigated by this 
watercourse. 
The other factor necessitating the revision of the rotation was the construction of two new 
branches discussed above: the Chak Aziz branch, which was lengthened and replaced the ding; 
branch; and the creation of a new Khudaya branch separate from the Muradke channel. This new 
rotation was sanctioned in August 1966 and was the basis for the rotation in operation in 1977. It 
includes lead time for filling the channel and extra time for citrus orchards; and it was on this rota- 
tion that the annual twelve hour shift of time was introduced: every April 1 the rotation shifts 12 
hours alternately backward and forward, so that people who irrigate at night one year, irrigate dur- 
ing the day the following year. 
This rotation has been slightly revised twice since 1966. In March 1971, it was changed to 
reflect the division of land between the numbardar family and his cousin. In August 1975. another 
revision occurred when an absent Khudaya family sold a small piece of its land. Table 2  presents 
the revised rotation. Notes are based on observations of, and informants’ statements concerning, 
actual practices where they differ from the official r0tation.O 
gUnfonunately, through an oversight. I failed to get detailed data on tenancy on this watercourse. Most owners are self- 
cultivators. Some of the landowned by the Kharal is cultivated by tenants, both Gondalpur and Chak Aziz residents. Some 
of the land owned by the Miane and Several Khudaya is also cultivated by Sayid and Rhani tenants in Gondalpur. In these 
cases, the internal distribution of the water is decided by the owners in consultation  with his tenants. 
57 Table 2. Current Irrigation Rotation on the ”Main” Watercourse. Gondalpur. 
Branch’ 
Owner’ 
3  Square 
numbers 
~  ~~ 
Area  Starting 










Mumtaz. Mna, Khizarane4 
Abdul. Khirarane 
Mna,  Ghulam. Khizarane 
La1 Shah IPirpur)  50 
Nawab Shah, Sayad 
6  Khushi, Khirarane 
Raja  etC, Khizarane tl Sardar Machchl7  23, 25, 33. 34, 39.46, 47 
Salabat. Hayat. Sahll, Khtzarane’  23,24,25,38,46 
25. 34. 39,46,  47. 50. 51 
23, 25, 26, 34, 38. 46 
25, 26, 32. 45,46.  50.  51 
24, 33, 34, 46,49,  50 
34. 39, 46, 50 
5 
9.  Nadar & Sardar Shah, Sayid 
10.  Murad etc. Dhudhi (Pindi) 
11.  Din tl Dost. Khizarane 
12.  Sher. Khizarane 
13.  Khan, Khizarane 
14.  Jahana & Rahman. Khizarane 
15.  Shabu (urban refugee) 
16.  Fateh (urban refugee) 
17.  Rahman. etal. Musalli 
18.  Saghir Shah, Sayid 
19~  Raja, Muradke” 




47.48.49,  50. 51 
33.38,46.47,50 
25. 26, 34,47 
34.39.40.47 
34.38.  39 
34.38.39 
25,26.33,36,  39,40 
39 
40, 46, 50 
29,  33.40 
23,26,  5’4 
Khudaya Branch 
21,22,27.34  21  All. Khudaya 
22  Sher. Khudaya  21,  27,38.  34,41 
23.  Baksh & Mallh. Khudaya  28.42,44,45 
24  Baksh,Khudaya”  30,40,  42, 45 




15  26.  Ghulam. et al..  Miane 
27.  Qaim. et al.,  Khydaya  28.29 
28.  Nuri. Khudaya  16 
29.  Dost. Khudaya  28.29 
Muradke Branch 
30.  Sardar. Khudaya17 
31.  Sada.  Muradke” 
32.  Ahmad, et aI.J9 
42,44,45 
22. 26,40,41,45 
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33.  Sher, el  al.. Kasise  32. 33, 40. 41 
Khizarane Branch 
34. 
Chak Aziz Branch 
35. 
Sardar. el  al.. Awan  20  25,  26. 27, 33. 34.40 




Rahim. el  al. again 
24 
25 
36.  Zaman, Langah 
37.  Ghulam. Langah 
38.  Lala, Khudaya 
39.  Hayat E Sardar, Langah 
40.  Moulu E Hariana  P ndi) 




21. 22. 26-28. 33, 38, 39, 




































water returns fo  Khizarane branch  at  6:OO 
Notes  Sources; Official rotation given in canal clerk's register, with notes on present practices from informants. 
See Map 1 for location of watercourse branches. 
5His son now cultivates; 9 min. lead lime. 
20wners' names, biradari. and village in  1) if not Gondalpur. 
6Mumtaz Khizarane cultivates this land on lease. 
3See 
Map 1 for locations of square numbers where land is located.  4lnformants include their fraternal nephew; 30  min. lead 
time.  7Raja is in Sind: 
his brothers cultivate; 12 min. lead time. 
00:15 Tuesday.  %her.  Kahn. Jahana. Raman (No. 12-14) are deceased; informants say Phule and Gula s/o  Khan take 
water at 6:32; then Dost s/o  Jahana at 8:14. Sher's sons are not mentioned but presumably taka water. 6 min. lead time 
in Khan's time.  10Deceased; son Ahmad cultivates. Square 29 is not on this branch; previous rotation lists squares 26, 
33, 34,40. 
120fficial time is on Khizarane branch, but actually used on Khudaya branch. 




other two. 48 min. lead time. 
Kharal to increase their supply. 
an informal internal rotation. Dost Rajeane bought 2.8 ha of this land, and rented another .4 ha from 2 Kharal men. but has 
not yet obtained Separate water for his land. Tjmes listed are on  Chak ALiz branch -but the landis on Khizarane branch. 
Each week Dost informally arranges for water.  24Lead time is 11 min. 
and succeeded by brother's son. All these Langah and Lala Khudaya work together and share water. 
and replaced by son. 
81nformants say Hayat takes water at 22:35: then Sahli at 23:25; the Salabat at 
l1  Mostlysandyarea not irrigated. Informants list this land as owned by Wali's son Anar, who cultivates. 
13Deceased; son cultivates.  14lncludes 
15Deceased;sons manage land now;  15 min. lead 
18Deceased:  2 sons now cultivate;  15  min. lead  16Nuri.s land includes 1.0 ha orchard. 
19Ahmad is deceased and succeeded by a son. Four households each take 3 hrs, and rotate who goesfirst. second. 
17Lead time is 6 min. 
2Whis land is in fact minutely subdivided.  21  Rahim, deceased, is succeeded by 2 half brothers of the 
221  know of no such tank, and informants never mentioned one. It may be a ruse for the 
23Rahim's sons' (the troublemakers) araa, "enemies"  with the other two,  but they have 
25Lead time is 10 min.  26~~~~t  is deceased, 
27Sahli deceased 
281nformal internal rotation. 
- 59  - One striking characteristic of the official rotation is that many of the holdings are still listed in 
the names of persons who were deceased even in 1966 when it was established. This reflects the 
legal position according to the records, since the rotation is based on the official record of rights. 
but shows people are evading the legal prescription to subdivide land when the owner dies. As a 
result of these demographic changes, the record does not reflect actual practice, and informal 
arrangements have been made among the successors for internal sharing of the water. This gap 
between the official rotation and social reality is a major force behind recent pressures to apply for 
another revision of the rotation. 
Another striking feature, as noted above, is that water is allocated to people, not specific pieces 
of land. A comparison of the square numbers in  which people hold land with the watercourse map 
shows that the plots belonging to one holding are widely scattered; in some cases they must even 
be irrigated by separate branches of the watercourse. If during one turn a man  must move water 
from one branch to another, a great deal of \Ivater is likely to be wasted. In fact this is often done; 
but in addition there is also a lot of informal trading of water to adjust to the problem. Another 
result of this single allocation of irrigation time for scattered plots of land is  that those owning 
land in the sandy or waterlogged areas have extra water that can be applied to their cultivable 
plots, This too has a consequence pointed out by several informants: it reduces the incentive for 
those farmers to participate in cleaning and maintenance, since they have more water than most. 
The allocation of water to people instead of land also creates a problem when land is purchased. 
After purchasing land, it is necessary to apply to the Irrigation Department for separate time for 
one's land, a lengthy and somewhat expensive, process. For example, Dost Mohammad, a Rajeane 
Bhatti, purchased about 2.8 hectares of land from Fazal Kharal of Chak Aziz. The land is actually 
located in  the middle of the Khizarane branch, far from Fazal's main holding. Thus. every week 
Mohammad must make an arrangement with Fazal to get water, including bringing it from the 
Chak Aziz branch to the Khizarane branch, a long distance. He has a similar problem with land he 
rents from another Kharal on the same branch. During the field work he was attempting to get 
separate rotation time, but despite paying a number of informal "fees," had not succeeded before I 
left. 
Another important characteristic of the rotation schedule given in Table 2 is the exactness of the 
times allotted to begin or finish irrigating. Times are given to the minute, such as 10:39 or 1:44. 
This leads to frequent disagreements, since watches often do not agree, and a man's field may not 
be complelely irrigated at the exact time when his neighbor is scheduled to take the water. 
Finally, the designers of the irrigation system (and the rotations) assumed holdings in multiples 
of at leqst 5.1 hectares, the smallest original colony allotment, which entitled the holder to nearly 
three hours of water per week on this watercourse. Effective irrigation under the constraints 
imposed by the low water supply per hectare requires planning irrigation for a holding of at least 
this size. However, many holdings are now  far smaller than reflected in the official rotation 
because of de facto divisions. The smallest holding listed in the official schedule is  0.5 hectare 
belonging to a Langah. His watercourse has a poor water supply, so that it takes about two hours 
to irrigate .4 hectare of land. With 19 minutes plus 10 minutes lead time to fill his irrigation ditch, 
a total of 29 minutes. this man could not manage within this schedule. Fortunately for him, his is 
a relatively cooperative biradari, so that with  judicious exchanges and trading he is usually able to 
irrigate his crops adequately. However, it is questionable how long such a formal rotation can 
work, if it becomes even more detailed and subdivided, in the absence of informal cooperation, 
trading, and sharing. 
The present rotation schedule is already losing its legitimacy, as the processes of land subdivi- 
sion, land transfers, and increasing conflicts among people who had previously cooperated, con- 
tinue. During the field work period, a land consolidation program and a watercourse 
- 60 - reconstruction program simultaneously raised hopes and led to an increase in tension, and many 
people expressed the opinion that it waS time to break this rotation schedule and create a new one 
(Merrey 1982, 1983). 
Conclusion 
In 1977 a Government research organization offered to assist in implementing a reconstruction 
program on the main watercourse. In this program, the Government provides engineering assist- 
ance and materials, including concrete outlet gates (pakka nakka);  the farmers provide the labor. 
Most people reacted enthusiastically to this program, but it soon bogged down in  disagreements 
over shares of work, and disputes with some who were attempting to sabotage the program. As 
reported in detail in Merrey (1982).  the villagers apparently had seen this as yet another opportup 
ity to solve the underlying social problems, but it was not successful. 
Other writings have explored various sociological problems and their historical roots in irrigation 
management in Pakistan (Merrey 1982, 1983, 1986).  Here I  wish to note a feature of rural Pakis- 
tani social structure that has not been emphasized previously. Even after about 80 years of adapt- 
ing to an imposed irrigation system, no specialized irrigation management roles have evolved 
separate from the larger social structure at the local level. It would not be correct to say that there 
is no irrigation management organization; rather, the roles and norms through which irrigation 
tasks are carried out are imbedded in the larger local social structure, especially the kinship-based 
biradari system. 
However, the social structure has no legitimate cultural mechanisms  YO insure that irrigation 
functions are fulfilled, ia,  that irrigation tasks requiring cooperation with others are done. Rather, 
as I  have shown in this paper, the irrigation system has become yet another weapon, as it were, in 
the conflicts endemic in rural Pakistani society. 
What lessons can be drawn from this case? It is not possible to offer a simple panacea, to solve 
all the complex organizational problems faced in  designing and managing irrigation systems. But it 
is clear that when an irrigation system is still at the planning and later at the design stage, it is 
essential to make serious use of local social data, as well as the usual technical considerations., 
These data must be gathered systematically by social scientists trained to understand what types 
of data are appropriate and necessary, to avoid overloading the designers with extraneous data. 
Irrigation planners and designers cannot assume that people will adjust themselves to the tech- 
nology, or by themselves evolve satisfactory solutions to what are often deeply imbedded sociolog- 
ical, political, and economic problems. An integral component of the design, construction, and 
operation processes must therefore be the development of appropriate organizational capacities so 
that the users can make the best use of the system. This would apply to rehabilitation and moder- 
nization projects on existing systems, as well as to new systems. 
Regarding Pakistan specifically, the case reported here is not unique. For example, Mirza and 
Merrey (1  979; Merrey 1982) show that similar problems characterized all of the recently rehabili- 
tated watercourses studied to varying degrees. The minute subdivision of land and therefore irri- 
gation times; the absence of an indigenous local capacity to ensure cooperation on collective 
tasks; and the "embeddedness"  of irrigation management tasks in  a highly fragmented and com- 
petitive social structure are serious and deep-rooted problems not amenable to standard types of 
social tinkering usually recommended by social scientists. 
The implication is that the continuing implementation of watercourse rehabilitation programs, 
even including recent efforts to organize water users associations will be problematical from a 
long term perspective in  the absence of more fundamental changes in system design and the 
organization of irrigation-related tasks. 
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